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Crimes
Crimes; aggravated sexual assault on children
Penal Code § 269 (new).
SBX 30 (Peace); 1994 STAT. Ch. 48X
Penal Code § 269 (new).
AB 3707 (Boland); 1994 STAT. Ch. 878
Under existing law, rape is defined as an act of sexual intercourse
accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under certain
specified circumstances, and is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for
three, six, or eight years.' Existing law also provides that any person who
commits a forcible2 sex offense against a child under the age of fourteen is guilty
of a felony that is punishable by three, six, or eight years in state prison and a fine
of up to $ 10,000. Chapter 48X creates a new crime of aggravated sexual assault
of a child.' Chapter 48X defines aggravated sexual assault of a child as sexual
conduct with a person under the age of fourteen who is ten or more years younger
than the perpetrator and the perpetrator commits forcible acts of rape, sodomy,
oral copulation, any sex crime in concert, or penetration by a foreign objectO
1. CAL PENAL CODE §§ 261,264 (West Supp. 1994); see People v. Jeff, 204 Cal. App. 3d 309, 324,
251 Cal. Rptr. 135, 143 (1988) (interpreting California's rape statute, as set forth in California Penal Code §
261, and holding that for a rape conviction, it must be shown that sexual intercourse was accomplished against
the will of the victim by means of fear and that the victim feared immediate and unlawful bodily injury).
2. See People v. Senior, 3 Cal. App. 4th 765, 774, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14, 19 (1992) (defining force to
mean physical force substantially different from, or substantially in excess of, that required for the lewd act)
(quoting People v. Quinones, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1158, 249 Cal. Rptr. 435, 438 (1988), review denied,
1992 Cal. LEXIS 1822 (1992)).
3. CAL PENALCODE § 288 (vest Supp. 1994); see People v. Wallace, I1 Cal. App. 4th 568,574, 14
Cal. Rptr. 2d 67, 71 (1992) (holding that lewd or lascivious acts are ones that are sexually unchaste or
licentious and which suggest moral looseness or incite sensual desire); People v. Gilbert, 5 Cal. App. 4th 1372,
1380, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660, 664 (1992) (holding that the crime of lewd and lascivious act with a child is
committed by any touching of a child with the requisite intent, and stating that the crime does not require that
the act be inherently sexual in nature), review denied, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 4055 (Aug. 12, 1992); see also
Hampton v. Commonwealth, 666 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Ky. 1984) (upholding a sentence of 105 years of
imprisonment for multiple convictions of sodomy and sexual abuse of a child); cf. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
510.070 (Baldwin 1993) (providing that sodomy in the first degree is a Class A felony when the victim is under
12 years of age and receives a serious physical injury); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (Michie Supp. 1994)
(providing that sexual penetration of a child under 13 years of age constitutes criminal sexual penetration and
is a first degree felony); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-07 (Supp. 1993) (providing that any adult who knowingly
has sexual contact with a minor who is 15 years of age or younger is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor offense
of sexual assault); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (Law. Co-op. 1993) (defining the crime of criminal sexual
conduct with minors).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 269 (enacted by Chapter 48X).
5. Id. § 269(a)(04-(5) (enacted by Chapter 48X); see State v. Hamilton, 501 A.2d 778, 780 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1985) (holding that for purposes of prosecuting first degree rape, a minor child under the age of 16 cannot
be a voluntary social companion of a custodial parent), affd without opinion, 515 A.2d 397 (Del. 1986);
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Chapter 48X provides that the crime of aggravated sexual assault of a child is a
felony and is punishable by a prison term of fifteen years to life.6
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
The intent of the Legislature in enacting Chapter 48X is to remove child rapists
from the community.' Sex offenses committed by strangers against children are
considered by the Legislature to be among the most vile acts imaginable!8 As a
result, recent times have witnessed a great public outcry demanding harsher
Commonwealth v. Gallant, 369 N.E.2d 707, 713 (Mass. 1977) (providing that proof of an irregular indulgence
in sexual behavior or illicit sexual relations can constitute unnatural sexual intercourse and thus support a
conviction of rape of a child under sixteen); cf N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.1 (1993) (providing that a person
is guilty of taking indecent liberties with children if, being 16 years of age or more and at least five years older
than the child in question, the person willfully commits or attempts to commit any lewd or lascivious act upon
or with the body or any part or member of the body of any child of either sex under the age of 16 years).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 269(b) (enacted by Chapter 48X); see State v. Brand, 363 N.W.2d 516, 520
(Neb. 1985) (holding that a sentence of 35 years in state prison without the possibility of parole for aggravated
sexual assault is not cruel and unusual punishment); see also State v. Baker, 426 S.E.2d 73, 73 (N.C. 1993)
(sentencing a defendant, who was convicted for taking indecent liberties with a minor, to a five-year suspended
sentence and special probation for five years), review denied, 433 S.E.2d 180 (N.C. 1993); Commonwealth
v. Gallant, 369 N.E.2d 707, 709 (Mass. 1977) (affirming a conviction of a defendant for having unnatural
sexual intercourse with a child under 16 years of age, for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment
in the state prison for a term of not less than five nor more than seven years); cf. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.434
(Supp. 1993), ARIz REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-604.01 (1989), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-405 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1994), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 22A (West 1990), NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319(I)(c) (Supp.
1993), NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.366(2)(c) (1991) (providing various penalties for aggravated sexual assault on
a child); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-407 (1990) (providing that in a prosecution for rape of a child, sodomy on
a child, and sexual abuse of a child, any touching, however slight, is sufficient to constitute the relevant
element of the offense). But see Marsha Weissman & Richard Luciana, Sentencing the Sex Offender: A Defense
Perspective, PLI Lra. & ADMIN. PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. C4-4185 259, 259 (1989)
(discussing the incarceration of sexual offenders, particularij those who prey on children, and asserting that
such offenders are in need of treatment that is not available or received in prisons). But cf. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-406.5 (1990) (providing that sentences for sex offenses committed against a child can be suspended,
if certain conditions are fulfilled); id. (setting forth conditions to be fulfilled in order for a sentence to be
suspended, including, inter alia, that the defendant did not use a weapon or force in committing the crime, did
not cause bodily injury to the child victim, did not use pornography, and did not act in concert with another
offender). See generally Arthur S. Frumkin, Note, The First Amendment and Mandatory Courtroom Closure
in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court. The Press' Righr, the Child Rape Victim's Plight, 11 HASTINOS
CONST. L.Q. 637 (1984) (discussing prosecutions of child rapists and the plight of the children involved in such
prosecutions).
7. SENATEJUDICIARY COMMirrEE, COMMrr=m ANALYSIS OFSBX 30, at 2 (May 17,1994); see Laura
Lane, Note, The Effects of the Abolition of the Corroboration Requirement in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 36
CATH. U. L. REV. 793, 802 (1987) (discussing the Child Abuse Reform Act of 1984 passed by the District of
Columbia City Council that was intended to eliminate obstacles hindering prosecution of sex offenders and
to ensure that more sex offenders were brought to justice); cf Hill v. State, 658 S.\V.2d 705,708 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983) (reversing a conviction for rape of a minor under the age of 17 for which the defendant was sentenced
for 99 years because the victim failed to inform someone of the offense within six months of its occurrence).
See generally Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly Committing Violent Sexual
Predators, 15 U. PUG-rSOUND L. REV. 709 (1992) (discussing a statute which requires certain individuals who
have been classified as violent sexual predators and are likely to continue to engage in acts of sexual violence
to be civilly committed to institutions when their punishment has been completed).
8. SENATEJUDICiARYCOMMITEE,COMMrrrEEANALYSISOFSBX30, at 2 (May 17. 1994).
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sentences for violent criminals, particularly recidivists and child sex offenders?
Because many sex offenders repeat their crimes, ensuring that child rapists are
imprisoned for longer periods of time should reduce the number of children made
victims of these child predators.'" Moreover, it is believed that violent sex
offenders do not receive adequate prison sentences or do not serve enough of the
sentence they have received." However, Chapter 48X may further exacerbate the
problem of prison overcrowding.' 2
Laura J. Fowler/Johnnie Beer
9. See Crime and Criminal Justice Reducing Recidivism: Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Criminal
Justice of the House Comm. on Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (testimony of Susan W. Sweetser,
Vermont State Senator) (advocating strict measures to control violent criminals, including lengthy, mandatory
minimum sentences, creation of a nation-wide databank for convicted sex offenders, and sex offender release
notification); Jeff Brown, Book Review, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 697, 697 (1994) (reviewing CANDACE MCCOY,
POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: Victims' RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA (1993)) (noting the wave of anti-crime
legislation sweeping California in response to the public's fears and outrage about crime, including legislation
such as the "fhree-Strikes" bill, and bills to prosecute more juveniles as adults, to limit death penalty defense
expenditures, and to ban plea bargaining for serious and violent offenses); Gayle M.B. Hanson, Experts Vexed
at What to Do with Sex Offenders: Authorities Try New Methods for Tracking Them, WASH. TMEs, June 6,
1994, at AS (noting that the public has clamored for tougher sentences for career criminals and is condemning
the criminal justice system for failing to decrease recidivism); Debra J. Saunders, Long Sentences Little
Punctuation, S.F. CHRON., June 28, 1993, at A16 (arguing for tougher laws on the state and federal level aimed
at keeping sexual offenders in jail for long periods of time and at ensuring that first time offenders do not get
light sentences).
10. See Sara Sun Beale, Prior SinilarActs in Prosecutionsfor Rape and Child Sex Abuse, 4 CRIM. L.F.
307, 307 (1993) (discussing prosecutions of child sexual abuse offenders and the possibility of allowing
evidence to be admitted that the defendant had committed prior acts of rape or child sex abuse); see also Daniel
J. Capra, Innovations in Prosecuting Child Sexual Abuse, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 9, 1989, at I (discussing the
difficulties posed in prosecuting child sexual abuse offenses). But see SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTrEE,
Cohmmm ANALYSIS OF SBX 30, at 2 (July 5, 1994) (stating that those opposed to SBX 30 argue that the
court has the authority under current law to impose consecutive sentences for each separate count, thereby
resulting in very long sentences for each crime). See generally Sherrye Henry, Suffer the Children; How the
Legal System Fails Neglected andAbused Children, WOMAN'S DAY, Oct. 30, 1990, at 52 (stating that sexual
offenders rarely attack just one child over a lifetime and that an average deviant will abuse 117 different
children); David A. Kaplan, The Incorrigibles, NENVS\VEEK, Jan. 18, 1993, at 48 (stating that there is a
consensus among criminologists that recidivist rates for sex offenders are generally higher than for those who
have committed other violent crimes); id. (discussing criminals convicted of sex crimes and stating that a
solution to punishing repeat offenders is to imprison them for life).
11. See California Sex Offenders Often Avoid Prison, UPI, May 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File (quoting a Califomia Department of Justice study which stated that 46% of all convicted
sex offenders are sentenced immediately to probation or spend less than one year in county jail, and that
convicted felony sex offenders who are sentenced to prison serve an average of three years and three months);
Saunders, supra note 9, at A16 (noting that the average California sex offender spends 38 months in prison).
12. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrTEE, COMMrI-rEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3707, at 3 (June 28, 1994); see
California Sex Offenders Often Avoid Prison, supra note 11 (stating that prison overcrowding has forced the
state to cut in half the sentences of most prisoners, including sex offenders). But see SENATE JUDICIARY
CoMMirFr, CommrrET ANALYSIS OF SBX 30, at 2 (July 5, 1994) (stating that those opposed to the bill
believe its sentence increases are excessive and disproportionate, and will only add to prison overcrowding).
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Crimes; arson-registration of offenders
Penal Code § 457.1 (amended).
ABX 8 (Hoge); 1994 STAT. Ch. 11X
Under certain circumstances, prior law authorized a court to require a person
convicted of arson, or discharged or paroled from the Department of the Youth
Authority for having committed arson, to register with any city or county within
thirty days of coming into the county or city where the person expected to reside
or be temporarily domiciled for at least thirty days.2 The court could require
registration of a defendant with prior convictions of arson, a present conviction
of arson, or a determination that in committing the offense, the defendant
exhibited compulsive behavior? Chapter IX makes registration mandatory
instead of discretionary, thus requiring registration for all arson offenders.
At prior law, the duty of a person to register as an arson offender, as adjudi-
cated by a juvenile court, terminated once the person reached the age of twenty-
five years.' Under Chapter I1X, the duty to register terminates ten years after the
1. See CAL PENAL CODE § 457.1(a) (amended by Chapter I IX) (defining arson, for purposes of this
section, as a violation of California Penal Code §§ 451 or 453); see also id. § 451 (West Supp. 1994)
(describing arson as where a person sets fire to or otherwise burns any structure, forest land, or property); id.
§ 453 (West 1988) (establishing as a crime the possession of any flammable, explosive or combustible material
or substance with intent to set fire to or bum any structure, forest land, or property).
2. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 589, sec. 113, at 2507 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 457.1); see Bruce
A. Berman, Review of Selected 1992 California Legislation, Criminal Procedure; Registration of Juvenile
Arson Offenders, 24 PAC. L.J. 591,792 (1993) (reviewing former California Penal Code § 457.1); see also
Abbott v. Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 681, 349 P.2d 974, 979, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163 (1960) (declaring
unconstitutional a city criminal registration ordinance that regulated a field already preempted by the state).
See generally 3 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for Crime §
1416 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1994) (stating that statutes that require persons convicted of certain crimes to
register with local law enforcement authorities are based upon the assumption that these persons are more likely
to be repeat offenders and that accurate information as to their whereabouts is therefore desirable); Annotation,
Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Persons Previously Convicted of Crime to Register with Designated
Officials, 82 A.L.R.2D 398 (1962) (analyzing cases dealing with statutes and ordinances that require persons
previously convicted of certain crimes to register with law enforcement officials).
3. 1993 Cal. Legis. Sere. ch. 589, sec. 113, at 2507 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 457.1 (b)(l)-(3));
see People v. Adams, 224 Cal. App. 3d 705, 710,274 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98 (1990) (holding that the trial court was
not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to consult psychiatric experts to determine whether defendant
exhibited compulsive behavior under California Penal Code § 457.1, but instead only needed to determine
whether the circumstances of the offense and the offender indicated that a repeat offense was likely such that
the purpose of the registration statue would be served), review denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 79 (1991).
4. CAL PENAL CODE § 457.1(b) (amended by Chapter 1 IX); see id. § 457.1(i) (amended by Chapter
1 IX) (mandating that a violation of this section is a misdemeanor, and that the offender must be sentenced to
between 90 days and one year in county jail); id. § 457.10) (amended by Chapter 1 IX) (providing that persons
released on parole or probation who are required to register under this section will have their parole or
probation revoked for a violation).
5. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 589, sec. 113, at 2507 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 457.1(d)); see id.
at 2508 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 457.1(h)) (providing that a person required to register under this
section may be relieved of that duty by obtaining a certificate of rehabilitation).
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adjudication of the offense.6
Prior law also required a first-time arson offender to comply with the
registration statute for five years after discharge from prison, release from jail, or
termination of probation or parole! Chapter IX makes registration mandatory
for all arson offenders, and therefore this provision is no longer effective!
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter I IX was enacted to enhance the effectiveness of the arson registration
file as an investigative source? Since most courts were not aware of their
authority to require registration, 0 the arson registration file was an incomplete
source of information on offenders." However, under Chapter IX, registration
is mandatory, and it is the responsibility of the official in charge of the place of
confinement to notify arson offenders of their duty to register upon their
discharge or parole from the place of confinement.'2
The Department of Justice has indicated that it cannot afford the costs of
Chapter 11X. t3 However, the Assembly Ways & Means Committee determined
that only minor administrative costs would be incurred.' 4
Maria V Daquipa
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 457.1(d) (amended by Chapter I lX); see id. § 457.1(m) (amended by Chapter
SIX) (providing that a person required to register under this section may be relieved of that duty by obtaining
a certificate of rehabilitation).
7. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 589, sec. 113, at 2508 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 457.1 (i)).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 457.1 (amended by Chapter 1 IX).
9. ASSEiBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF ABX 8. at 2 (June 6, 1994); see Andy Furillo,
Arsonists Rarely Face Law's Heat, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 30, 1993, at A20 (reporting on the difficulty of
finding arson offenders); id. (providing descriptions of typical arsonists); Pablo Lopez, Investigators' Hands
Tied asArson Cases, Soar in Fresno, FRESNO BEE, Sept. 12, 1994, at B I (reporting that arson in Fresno has
increased during the first half of the year by 34.7% compared to the same time period the previous year);
Geoffrey Mohan, 77Te FightAgainst Crime: Notes From the Front: Matching Wits with Nature andArsonists,
L.A. TimEs, Nov. 10, 1993. at Metro B2 (describing the difficulty in solving arson crimes).
10. See 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 589, sec. 113, at 2507 (amending CAL. PENALCODE § 457.1(b)(1)-
(3)) (authorizing the court to use discretion in requiring registration of arson offenders pursuant to a special
finding that the person has a previous or present arson conviction, or that the person exhibited compulsive
behavior in committing the offense).
11. ASSEmBLY FLOOR, COMMrrIEE ANALYSIS OFABX 8. at 2 (Aug. 26, 1994).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 457.1(c) (amended by Chapter I IX).
13. SENATE COMMriTEE ON APPROPRJATIONS, COMMITFEEANALYSIS OFABX 8, at I (Aug. 15, 1994).
14. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF ABX 8, at I (May 17,
1994); see id. (stating that costs would be incurred by the courts for additional registration notification
requirements, and by local law enforcement for registration and enforcement requirements).
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Crimes; diversions-deferred entry of judgment for suspected child abuse
offenders
Penal Code §§ 1000.14, 1000.15, 1000.16, 1000.18 (repealed); § 1000.12
(amended).
SBX 38 (Kopp); 1994 STAT. Ch. 49X
Existing law provides that, in lieu of prosecuting a person suspected of
committing any crime in which a minor is a victim of an act of abuse or neglect,
the prosecuting attorney may refer that person to the county department in charge
of public social services or the probation department for counseling or psycho-
logical treatment and any other services as the department deems necessary
Chapter 49X additionally provides that in lieu of trial, the prosecuting attorney
may make a motion to the trial court to defer entry of judgment with respect to
certain crimes charged involving a minor victim of molestation or sexual abuse,
provided that the defendant pleads guilty to all crimes and enhancements
charged.2 Upon that motion and the defendant's plea, the court may defer entry
of judgment, contingent upon the defendant's referral to and completion of a
treatment program approved by the prosecuting attorney.' Upon the defendant's
successful completion of the treatment program, and upon the positive
recommendation of the treatment program authority and the motion of the
prosecuting attorney, the court must dismiss the charge(s) against the defendant.'
Upon any failure of treatment under the treatment program, the prosecuting
attorney may make a motion to the court for entry of judgment and the court
must, upon a finding of failure of treatment based on a preponderance of
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.12(b) (amended by Chapter 49X); see id. (requiring the prosecuting
attorney to seek the advice of the county department in charge of public social services or the probation
department in determining whether to make the referral). See generally Robert Mertens, Comment, Child
Sexual Abuse in California: Legislative and Judicial Responses, 15 GOLDEN GATE U. L. RItv. 437, 437-92
(1985) (explaining how many state legislatures are beginning to adapt their criminal justice systems to the
unique problems that child victims face).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.12(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 49X); see id. § 1000.12(c)(4) (amended
by Chapter 49X) (requiring that the deferred entry of judgment be granted upon the following terms: (1)
Defendant must seek and participate in a rehabilitation program as prescribed by the district attorney; (2)
defendant must not use, handle, or have in his or her possession marijuana, narcotics, dangerous drugs, or
controlled substances of any kind, unless lawfully prescribed for the defendant by a licensed physician; (3)
defendant must not associate with known or reputed users or sellers of marijuana, dangerous drugs, or
narcotics, or be in places where narcotics or dangerous drugs are present; (4) defendant must submit his or her
person, property, automobile, and any object under defendant's control to search and seizure in or out of the
presence of the defendant, by any law enforcement officer or probation officer, (5) unification with the family
or unsupervised contact with the minor victim or any other minor will be prohibited except upon
recommendation of the treatment program and motion of the district attorney and order of the court; and (6)
any violation of the law constitutes a failure of treatment).
3. Id. § 1000.12(c)(l) (amended by Chapter 49X); see id. § 1000:12(a) (amended by Chapter 49X)
(declaring that the Legislature intends to allow the prosecuting attorney to prosecute any person who is
suspected of committing any crime in which a minor is a victim of an act of molestation, abuse, or neglect to
the fullest extent of the law, if the prosecuting attorney so chooses).
4. Id. § 1000.12(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 49X).
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evidence, enter judgment upon the defendant's pleas and admissions, and
schedule a sentencing hearing as otherwise provided under the law.5
Existing law sets forth administrative guidelines relating to counseling
programs for those persons who are suspected of sexually abusing a child and
who are referred for counseling in lieu of prosecution. Certain provisions under
prior law governed the procedures for monitoring persons participating in a
counseling program and the consequences of successful or unsuccessful
completion of a program.7 Chapter 49X repeals those provisions!s
5. Id. § 1000.12(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 49X); see id. § 1000.12(c)(3) (amended by Chapter 49X)
(requiring the office of the prosecuting attorney to promulgate eligibility standards for deferred entry of
judgment and treatment of defendants described under Chapter 49X, which must include, but are not limited
to, all of the following: (I) Deferred entry ofjudgment for the defendant is in the best interests of the minor
victim; (2) rehabilitation of the defendant is feasible in a recognized treatment program designed to deal with
child molestation, abuse, or neglect, as specifically related to the charges made, and if the defendant is to
remain in the household or to have unsupervised contact with the minor victim at any time during his or her
participation in the treatment program, the program is specifically designed to deal with the conduct supporting
the offense charged; (3) there is no threat of harm to the minor victim if entry of judgment is deferred; (4) no
person will be deemed eligible for deferred entry of judgment under this section unless he or she pleads guilty
to all charges and enhancements; (5) deferred entry ofjudgment will not apply to any person who is charged
with committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of fourteen, or any other sexual offense,
involving force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the minor victim
or another person; and (6) any person who applies for deferred entry of judgment must also meet all of the
requirements for the counseling program delineated under § 1000.13); id. § 1000.13(a) (West 1985)
(prohibiting any person suspected of violating any section of the California Penal Code in which a minor is
a victim of sexual abuse from being referred for counseling in lieu of prosecution except upon written
agreement between the prosecuting attorney and the suspected person and unless all of the following apply to
the suspected person: (1) The person is a family member of the victim, and "family member" means a parent,
stepparent, sibling, aunt, uncle, cousin, grandparent, or a member of the victim's household who has developed
a family relationship with the victim; (2) the person's criminal record does not indicate that diversion has been
terminated, or probation or parole has been revoked, without thereafter being completed within the previous
10 years; (3) the person has not been referred to counseling or other services prior to the commission of the
present alleged offense; (4) the person has no prior conviction for any sexual offense or any offense in which
a minor is a victim of sexual abuse and has no conviction for any felony offense involving violence against
another person during the previous 10 years in which the suspected person remained free of prison custody);
id. § 1000.13(b) (West 1985) (adding that the prosecuting attorney may impose additional relevant criteria for
determining whether to refer the suspected person under this chapter to counseling); see also People v. Everett,
186 Cal. App. 3d 274, 280, 230 Cal. Rptr. 604, 608 (1986) (holding that the 10-year limitation of California
Penal Code § 1000.13, which prohibits diversion for anyone convicted within the previous 10 years of any
felony involving violence against another person, does not apply to prior felony sex offenses).
6. CAL PENALCODE § 1000.17 (West 1985); see id. (declaring that if the person is referred, he or she
shall be responsible for paying the administrative cost of the referral and the expense of such counseling as
determined by the county department responsible for public social services or the probation department, and
the administrative cost of the referral must not exceed $100 for any person referred for an offense punishable
as a felony and shall not exceed $50 for any person referred for an offense punishable as a misdemeanor); see
also id. (noting that the department must take into consideration the ability of the referred party to pay, and no
such person will be denied counseling services because of his or her inability to pay).
7. 1983 Cal. Stat. ch. 804, sec. 2, at 2006 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.14); see id. (declaring
that if the person suspected of sexually abusing a child is referred to a counseling program pursuant to
California Penal Code § 1000.13, the county department responsible for public social services or the probation
department must monitor the progress of the referred person in the counseling program and must report to the
prosecuting attorney regarding that progress at agreed upon intervals, and if the person successfully completes
the counseling program, the department must report that fact in writing to both the prosecuting attorney and
the person); id. (enacting CAL PENAL CODE § 1000.15) (providing that if the person suspected of sexually
abusing a child fails to participate in or fails to successfully complete the counseling program as directed, or
Pacific Law Journal
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INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
According to the author of Chapter 49X, the purpose of the new law is to
provide an incentive for diverted suspects to successfully complete treatment
programs by offering such suspects a chance to avoid conviction! Some
therapists believe that those who physically or sexually abuse others must
experience at least some of the penal consequences of their acts in order to begin
to understand their wrongfulness; this, therapists argue, is an essential component
of the offenders' therapy, and to the extent that this theory is correct, requiring
defendants to admit guilt may increase the likelihood that the defendants will
successfully complete treatment.'0
Because reports of child abuse have risen 31% between 1988 and 1990, the
need to protect children and preserve families has never been greater." In 1990,
1.7 million reports of child abuse and neglect that involved 2.7 million children
were filed, and by 1993 all fifty states had created special phone numbers for
reporting abuse and neglect of children.'2
In recent years, accounts of child sexual abuse have become commonplace, and
studies reveal that the incidence of reported sexual abuse among children has
increased from less than 1% per 10,000 children in 1976 to approximately 17.9%
is subsequently charged with any offense involving violence against another person or any offense involving
abuse or neglect of a child, the county department responsible for public social services or the probation
department must report that failure or subsequently charged offense to the prosecuting attorney who will
determine whether to institute prosecution of the suspected person for the violation giving rise to the referral);
id. (enacting CAL PENAL CODE § 1000.16) (providing that no statement or information prepared therefrom,
with respect to the specific offense for which the person is suspected, which is made to any social or
community program worker or the probation department during any counseling program assigned pursuant to
this chapter will be admissible in any future criminal action or proceeding); id. (enacting CAL. PENAL COD1E
§ 1000.18) (stating that the counseling program may not exceed five years from the time the person suspected
of abusing or neglecting the child is referred, but if the suspected person successfully completes the counseling
program he or she will not be prosecuted for the alleged offense).
8. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 49X, sec. 2-5, at 4010 (repealing CAL PENALCODE §§ 1000.14, 1000.15,
1000.16, and 1000.18).
9. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, CoMMrTrEE ANALYSIS OF SBX 38, at 1 (Aug. 29, 1994); see ASSEMBLY
COMMrFTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, CommrFmEi ANALYSIS OF SBX 38, at I (July 5, 1994) (noting that diversion
programs are commonly used in cases of drug-related offenses and domestic violence). But see id. at 3-4
(suggesting that by requiring a plea of guilty in order to enter the treatment program, defendants will be forced
to give up their right to a trial, and they will lose the opportunity to have their guilt determined in a court of
law if the treatment fails).
10. ASSEMBLYCOMMir EEONPUBLICSAFMrY,COMMIrEEANALYSISOFSBX 38, at 3 (June 28, 1994);
see id. (emphasizing that a plea of nobo contendere in lieu of pleading guilty will not be sufficient to grant the
suspect the deferred entry of judgment).
11. Child Activists Say Federal Drug Policy to Blame for Increases, ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE
WEEK, Apr. 22, 1992, at 6; see id. (stating that the impact of chemical dependency on the child welfare
system's ability to provide services has been profound because drug and alcohol related problems increase the
number of children and families who need intervention and services, as well as complicate family preservation
and unity).
12. Constance Stapleton, Could the State Take Your Child?, WOMAN'S DAY, May 18, 1993, at 54; see
id. (noting that in most states, professionals who deal with children--teachers, doctors, day-care workers,
emergency-room personnel, and others-are required to report suspected abuse and neglect, and failure to report
is often punishable by up to a year in prison and a $1000 fine).
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in 1985.13 The more pervasive forms of physical abuse embodied in the excesses
of corporal punishment in the home are creating harm as well. 4 Since the parent
who understands a child's behavior is less likely to be abusive, there exists a need
for programs that teach the values of positive parenting techniques. 5
Joseph A. Tommasino
Crimes; firearms-criminal possession of a firearm
Penal Code § 12040 (new).
ABX 91 (Burton); 1994 STAT. Ch. 27X
Existing law contains various provisions relating to firearms.' Chapter 27X
creates the crime of criminal possession of a firearm, which is defined as the
carrying of a firearm by a person in public while the person is masked to hide his
or her identity.2 Chapter 27X provides that criminal possession of a firearm is
13. G. Russell Nuce, Comment, Child Sexual Abuse: A New Decade for the Protection of Our
Children?, 39 EMORY LJ. 581,582 (1990); see id. (stating that once child sexual abuse is reported there are
often legal barriers to the successful prosecution of these cases for several reasons: (I) It is rarely witnessed
by anyone other than the victim, child sexual abuse is often difficult to prove, and consequently many offenders
who are arrested plea bargain to lesser charges, are often released, and repeat the offenses; (2) many people
within the criminal justice system believe that sexual abusers have mental disorders and therefore should be
treated by the mental health system; (3) many parents fear that the pursuit of those cases would further
traumatize the child, so they are reluctant to proceed within the judicial system; and (4) prosecutors are often
reluctant to undertake sexual abuse cases that rest primarily on the testimony of child victims because
prosecutors fear that children will be unable to provide adequate testimony, and therefore resources should be
directed to other cases); cf. Claudia Morain, When Children Molest Children: Physicians Are Being Asked to
Learn More About This Increasingly Recognized Problem. AM. MED. NEWs, Jan. 3, 1994, at 13 (noting that
in 1992, 220,000 total cases of child sexual abuse were reported in the annual Survey of Child Abuse and
Neglect, a compilation of reports made to child-protection agencies in all 50 states).
14. Lisa C. Jones, Why Are We Beating Our Children? EBONY, Mar. 1993, at 80; see id. (asserting that
a growing number of parents who are finding it difficult to cope with the escalating pressures of poverty,
unemployment, drug abuse, and single parenthood are lashing out at their children in fits of anger rather than
in acts of love).
15. Id.
1. See CAL PENALCODE §§ 12000-12101 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (setting forth various provisions
relating to firearms, including but not limited to, unlawful carrying and possession of concealed weapons,
licenses to sell firearms, obliteration of identification marks on firearms, firearm permits, and possession of
firearms by juveniles); id. § 12001(b) (West Supp. 1994) (defining firearm as any device designed to be used
as a weapon, from which is expelled through a barrel a projectile by the force of any explosion or other form
of combustion).
2. Id. § 12040(a) (enacted by Chapter 27X).
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punishable as a misdemeanor or felony.3 Chapter 27X specifies exceptions to its
prohibition
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
By enacting Chapter 27X, the Legislature seeks to prevent situations where
persons possess or carry firearms under circumstances where there is illicit intent
or a unique danger to public safety, without imposing overly broad impacts upon
the conduct of otherwise law abiding citizens.5 Prior to Chapter 27X, California
had no specific prohibition on possessing a firearm in public while masked to
conceal one's identity.6
Until 1984, California had an anti-mask law, enacted as a reaction to the
activity of the Klu Klux Klan, but the law was found to be overbroad and
unconstitutional. Still, the repealed anti-mask statute had no relation to firearms,
3. Id. § 12040(b) (enacted by Chapter 27X); see id. (providing that criminal possession of a firearm
is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year).
4. Id. § 12040(c)(1)-(5) (enacted by Chapter 27X); see id. § 12040(c)(1) (enacted by Chapter 27X)
(exempting peace officers who are acting in the performance of their duties); id. § 12040(c)(2) (enacted by
Chapter 27X) (exempting full-time paid peace officers of other states and the federal government who are
carrying out their official duties while in the state); id. § 120,0(c)(3) (enacted by Chapter 27X) (exempting any
person summoned to assist a peace officer in making an arrest or preserving the peace while he or she is
actually engaged in assisting that officer); id. § 12040(c)(4) (enacted by Chapter 27X) (exempting the
possession of an unloaded firearm or a firearm loaded with blanks by an authorized participant in entertainment
or theatrical events); id. § 12040(c)(5) (enacted by Chapter 27X) (providing that the prohibition of California
Penal Code § 12040(a) does not apply to the possession of a firearm by a licensed hunter while hunting or
going to or from hunting); see also People v. Jimenez, 8 Cal. App. 4th 391,395-96, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 281,283
(1992) (holding that a defendant charged with a weapon possession violation has the burden of proving an
affirmative defense that he had possessed and registered his assault weapon during a window period prescribed
by California Penal Code § 12280); People v. Ross, 60 Cal. App. 163, 167, 212 P. 627, 629 (1922) (holding
that, in a firearms violation prosecution, the burden of proving that the defendant fits an exception to the statute
rests upon the defendant).
5. ASSEmBLY CommIrnm ON PtJBLI SAFETY, COMMrm ANALYSIS OF ABX 91, at 3 (Apr. 5, 1994);
see SENA' JUDICIARY COMMIrrEE, COMMrI-EE ANALYSIS OFABX 91, at 3 (Aug. 8, 1994) (stating that ABX
91 does not require any proof of intent to commit a crime, as the act of being masked while in possession of
a firearm, be it lawful or unlawful, will constitute criminal possession of a firearm).
6. ASSEMBLY COMMrirEE ON PUBLC SAFETY, CoMriraE ANALYSIS OF ABX 91, at 3 (Apr. 5, 1994).
7. See 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 438, sec. 9, at 1821 (repealing CAL. PENAL CODE § 650a) (providing that
it was a misdemeanor to wear a mask in order to conceal identity, except as part of an entertainment event);
Ghafari v. Municipal Court, 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 262, 150 Cal. Rptr. 813, 816 (1978) (holding that
California's statute prohibiting the wearing of a mask in public was overbroad and unconstitutional, as it was
not required by a compelling state interest and was not drafted in the least restrictive manner). But see State
v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547,550 (Ga. 1990) (holding that Georgia's anti-mask statute does not unconstitutionally
restrict free speech as the statute furthers a substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression
of speech and the restriction on First Amendment freedom is no greater than necessary). See generally Wayne
R. Allen, Note, Klan, Cloth and Constitution: Anti-Mask Laws and the First Amendment, 25 GA. L. REV. 819
(1991) (examining the origins and applications of anti-mask laws, the constitutional limitations placed upon
them, the inconsistent judicial decisions on the issues raised, and concluding that carefully drafted anti-mask
laws can fulfill their legitimate purpose while not infringing on First Amendment rights).
Pacific Law Journal/VoL 26
1993-1994 First Extraordinary Session
whereas Chapter 27X is directly related to the possession of firearms! Illinois
already has a similar prohibition in effect.9
Darren K. Cottriel
Crimes; mentally disordered sex offenders-credit for time on outpatient
status
Penal Code §§ 1026.5, 1600.5 (amended); Welfare and Institutions Code §
6332 (new).
SBX 39 (Russell); 1994 STAT. Ch. 9X
Existing law provides that, in the case of any person who has committed a
felony and is subsequently committed, or placed on outpatient status, or confined
to a state hospital or other treatment facility, a maximum term of commitment t
must be determined, and the person may not be kept in actual custody longer than
the maximum term of commitment, except as specified.2 Existing law further
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12040(a) (enacted by Chapter 27X).
9. ASSEiBLY COMMrrrEE ON PUBLIC SAFErY, COmmrmEE ANALYSTS OFABX 91, at 4 (Apr. 5, 1994);
see ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/24-1(a)(9) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994) (prohibiting the possession of a pistol,
revolver, stun gun or taser gun or firearm or ballistic knife while hooded, robed, or masked in such a manner
as to conceal one's identity); SENATEJUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OFABX 91, at 3 (Aug.
8, 1994) (stating that although the Illinois anti-mask statute has anti-KKK antecedents, its primary use appears
to be against criminals who possess firearms when the conduct in question has not reached an otherwise
punishable atteipt, and as such, the statute's focus is on firearms possession where there is an indication of
criminal intent).
1. See CAL PENAL CODE § 1026.5(a)(I) (amended by Chapter 9X) (defining "maximum term of
commitment" as the longest term of imprisonment that could have been imposed for the offense or offenses
of which the person was convicted, including the upper term of the base offense and any additional terms for
enhancements and consecutive sentences which could have been imposed, less any applicable credits as defined
by California Penal Code § 2900.5, and disregarding any credits which could have been earned pursuant to
Article 2.5 (commencing with § 2930) of the California Penal Code).
2. Id.; see id. § 1026.5(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 9X) (providing that a person may be committed
beyond the maximum term of commitment only under the procedure set forth in California Penal Code §
1026.5(b) only if the person has been committed under California Penal Code § 1026 for a felony and by
reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others); see
also id. § 1026 (West Supp. 1994) (enumerating the procedural requirements involved in the commitment or
confinement of a person); id. § 1604 (West Supp. 1994) (discussing the recommendation of a person for
outpatient status); People v. Bodis, 174 Cal. App. 3d 435, 437-38, 220 Cal. Rptr. 57, 58 (1985) (stating that
the confinement of a person found to be insane and sentenced under California Penal Code § 1026, governing
pleas of insanity, is for care and treatment, not punishment; and thus, persons found guilty by reason of insanity
and confined to a hospital are not similarly situated to mentally disordered sex offenders and are not entitled
to pretrial conduct credits). See generally Mary J. O'Meara, Note: Constitutional Law: Involuntary Outpatient
Civil Commitment Expanded: The 1983 Changes, 62 N.C. L. REV. 1158, 1164 (1984) (illustrating a potential
problem under North Carolina law a decade ago involving the length of a defendant's commitment to
outpatient treatment).
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provides that where the court orjury finds that the person represents a substantial
danger of physical harm to others, the court must order the person recommitted
for an additional period of two years.3
Chapter 9X provides that a person who is recommitted may not be kept in
actual custody longer than two years, unless another extension of commitment is
obtained, as specified.4 Chapter 9X also provides that time spent on outpatient
status, except when placed in a locked facility at the direction of the outpatient
supervisor, will not count as actual custody or be credited toward the person's
maximum term of commitment or toward the person's term of extended
commitment.5
Existing law provides that for a person committed as a mentally disordered sex
offender, or a person committed after a plea of insanity,6 who is placed on
3. CAL PENAL CODE § 1026.5(b)(8) (amended by Chapter 9X); see id. (noting that the patient will be
recommitted to the facility in which the patient was confined at the time the petition was filed).
4. Id.; see id. (stating that the person may be committed for longer than two years if an extension is
obtained pursuant to California Penal Code § 1026.5(b)).
5. Id.; id. § 1600.5 (amended by Chapter 9X); CAt. \vELF. & INST. CODE § 6332 (enacted by Chapter
9X); see People v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1308, 1312, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 896, 897 (1993) (holding that
where a person has been committed as a mentally disordered sex offender, the maximum term of commitment
does not run while the person is on outpatient status). See generally Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, When
is Federal Prisoner Entitled, Under 18 USCS § 3568, to Credit for Time Spent in State Custody "In
Connection With" Offense or Acts for Which Federal Sentence Was Imposed, 47 A.L.R. FED. 755 (1980)
(collecting and analyzing the federal cases in which the courts have dealt with the question of when a federal
prisoner is entitled to credit on his federal sentence for time spent in state custody in connection with the
offense or acts for which the federal sentence was imposed); Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Right to Creditfor
Time Spent in Custody Prior to Trial or Sentence, 77 A.L.R.3D 182 (1977) (giving a general overview of the
topic as well as an application and construction of statutes expressly governing credits); Annotation, Right of
State or Federal Prisoner to Credit for Time Served in Another Jurisdiction Before Delivery to State or Federal
Authorities, 18 A.L.R.2D 511 (1951) (explaining the following types of credits: (1) Credit for federal time on
state sentences; (2) credit for state time on federal sentences; and (3) credit for state time on a sentence in
another state).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(a) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that if a defendant is found to be
insane at the time an offense was committed, the court must direct that the defendant be confined in a state
hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered or any other appropriate public or private
treatment facility approved by the community program director, or the court may order the defendant placed
on outpatient status pursuant to Title 15 (commencing with section 1600) of the California Penal Code); id.
§ 1026(b) (West Supp. 1994) (noting that prior to making the order directing that the defendant be placed on
outpatient status or confined in a state hospital or other treatment facility, the court must order the community
program director or a designee to evaluate the defendant and to submit to the court within 15 judicial days of
the order a written recommendation as to whether the defendant should be placed on outpatient status or
confined in a state hospital or other treatment facility, but if it appears to the court that the sanity of the
defendant has been recovered fully, the defendant must be remanded to the custody of the sheriff until the issue
of sanity is finally determined in the manner prescribed by law); id. § 1026.5(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 9X)
(providing that in the case of any person committed to a state hospital or other treatment facility pursuant to
California Penal Code § 1026 or placed on outpatient status pursuant to California Penal Code § 1604, and who
committed a felony on or after July 1, 1977, the court must state in the commitment order the maximum term
of commitment, and the person may not be kept in actual custody longer than the maximum term of
commitment, except as otherwise provided by law); id. § 1604(a) (Vest Supp. 1994) (providing that upon
receipt by the committing court of the recommendation of the director of the state hospital or other treatment
facility to which the person has been committed that the person may be eligible for outpatient status, the court
must immediately forward such recommendation to the community program director, prosecutor, and defense
counsel).
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outpatient status, time spent on outpatient status, except when placed in a locked
facility, will not count as actual custody and will not be credited toward the
person's maximum term of commitment! Chapter 9X clarifies that a person
committed as a mentally disordered sex offender is a person committed under
certain former provisions of the California Welfare and Institutions Code!
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Prior to Chapter 9X, the State did not count outpatient time toward meeting the
maximum terms of commitment for either mentally disordered sex offenders or
those found not guilty by reason of insanity; however, in People v. Gunderson,9
a California appellate court held that outpatient time should count.10 As a result,
the author of Chapter 9X introduced it in response to the reasoning of this 1991
7. Id. § 1600.5 (amended by Chapter 9X); see 1967 Cal. Stat. ch. 1667 sec. 37, at 4107 (enacting CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 6300) (defining mentally disordered sex offender as any person who by reason of
mental defect, disease, or disorder, is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that
he is dangerous to the health and safety of others); cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.67(1) (West 1992 & Supp.
1994) (establishing a sex offender treatment system under the administration of the commissioner of
corrections to provide and finance a range of sex offender treatment programs for eligible adults and juveniles);
id. § 242.195(3) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (providing that when ajuvenile is committed to the commissioner
of corrections by ajuvenile court, upon a finding of delinquency for a sex offense, the commissioner may, for
the purposes of treatment and rehabilitation: (1) Order the child confined to a state juvenile correctional facility
that provides the appropriate level ofjuvenile sex offender treatment; (2) purchase sex offender treatment from
a county and place the child in the county's qualifyingjuvenile correctional facility; (3) purchase sex offender
treatment from a qualifying private residential juvenile sex offender treatment program and place the child in
the program; (4) purchase outpatient juvenile sex offender treatment for the child from a qualifying county or
private program and order the child released on parole under treatment and other supervisions and conditions
the commissioner believes to be appropriate; (5) order reconfinement or renewed parole, revoke or modify any
order, or discharge the child; or (6) refer the child to a county welfare board or licensed child-placing agency
for placement in foster care, or when appropriate, for initiation of the child in need of protection or services
proceedings); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992) (declaring a legislative finding that sexually
violent predators have antisocial personality features which are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment
modalities and those features render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior and adding that the
prognosis for curing sexually violent offenders is poor, the treatment needs of this population are very long
term, and the treatment modalities for this population are very different than the traditional treatment modalities
for people appropriate for commitment under the involuntary treatment act). See generally Jill J. Spitz, "It's
Not Kiddie Court Anymore;" Preteen Sex Offenders Are Committing Crimes Unheard of a Decade Ago,
Clogging the Juvenile Justice System, ORLANDO SENaRiEL, Jan. 9, 1994, at I (lamenting the fact that the state
of Florida offered so little treatment for sex offenders, for statistics showed that three-quarters of young
offenders could benefit from outpatient treatment and that far more community involvement was needed to
address the problem).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1600.5 (amended by Chapter 9X); seel981 Cal. StaL ch. 928, sec. 2, at 3485
(repealing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6316) (providing for an offender's return to criminal court for further
disposition or commitment to a hospital or other facility for care and treatment); id. (repealing CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 6316.2) (listing the former applicable statutes that dealt with judicial commitment of sex
offenders). See generally V. Woerner, Annotation, Statutes Relating to Sexual Psychopaths, 24 A.L.R.2D 350,
350-380 (1952) (discussing the constitutionality, validity, construction, and application of statutes relating to
sexual psychopaths).
9. 228 Cal. App. 3d 1292, 279 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1991).
10. Gunderson, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 1294, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 495 (1991); see SENATE COMMITrEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS, CoMMrrrEe ANALYSIS OF SBX 39, at 1 (Apr. 18, 1994) (noting that the State has not
changed policy to conform to the court decision).
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case." The significant resulting effect of that decision was that mentally dis-
ordered sex offenders who represent a substantial danger of physical harm to
others could be released earlier into the community without any subsequent health
treatment or supervision."
To remedy the problem discovered as a result of Gunderson, Chapter 9X
explicitly provides that time spent in outpatient status by a mentally disordered
sex offender may not be counted toward the maximum term of commitment or the
extended period of commitment, unless he or she is placed in a locked facility at
the direction of the outpatient supervisor. 3 In addition, to ensure that the court's
reasoning does not pose similar problems with respect to people who are found
not guilty by reason of insanity, Chapter 9X also provides that time spent in
outpatient status by such people may not be counted toward the maximum term
of commitment or the extended period of commitment unless they are placed in
a locked facility at the direction of the outpatient supervisor.14
The problem of sexual predators is proving to have no simple solutions, but just
as people across the country have clamored for tougher sentences for career
felons, they also are condemning a criminal justice system that seems unable to
address the high recidivism rates among serial sex offenders. 5 At least twenty-
11. SENATE JuDICIARY CoMMrTEE, CoMITEE ANALYSIS OF SBX 39, at 2 (Mar. 22, 1994); see
Gunderson, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 1294, 1298,279 Cal. Rptr. at 495,497 (1991) (holding that because of the way
former California Welfare and Institutions Code § 6316.2 was written, time spent in outpatient status by a
mentally disordered sex offender must be counted toward the time spent in extended commitment).
12. SENATE Com rTEEON AI'PROPRIATIONS, CoMmYrrEEANALYsis OF SBX 39, at 1 (Apr. 18, 1994);
see Barbara Kessler, Sex-Offenders Programs Get Start in State Prisons; Texas' Effort Stymied by Money,
Perceptions, DALLAs MORNING NEws, Oct. 17, 1993, at IA (praising group therapy as the most effective way
to reach sex offenders, and stating that it has become the centerpiece of most outpatient and prison programs,
including the one in Texas; and adding that the group tenor is confrontational as it shreds the secrecy and
rationalization that are the twin crutches of pedophiles, people who are sexually attracted to children). The
group therapy used in Texas stays away from more controversial methods, such as sex-inhibiting drugs, which
are considered viable aids by many therapists but have long-term physical side effects, including weight gain,
migraine headaches and gallstones; the plethysmograph, a device that can be attached to the penis to measure
arousal responses, also is shunned. Id.
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.5(b)(8) (amended by Chapter 9X).
14. Id. §§ 1026.5, 1600.5 (amended by Chapter 9X); CAL WET. & INST. CODE § 6332 (amended by
Chapter 9X); see ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBLC SAFETY, ComrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SBX 39, at 3 (July 5,
1994) (adding that SBX 39 will save the state unnecessary expenses, for in the absence of SBX 39, the
Department of Mental Health would be foreed to go through the expensive process of seeking extensions of
commitment in court every two years for all persons who have outpatient status). But see id. (noting that under
California Penal Code § 1606, all persons on outpatient status are entitled to an annual review in court of their
outpatient status, at which time the patient can be released, continued on outpatient status, or rehospitalizcd).
15. Gayle M.B. Hanson, Experts Vexed at What to Do with Sex Offenders; Authorities Try New
Methods for Tracking Them, WASH. TIMES, June 6, 1994, at As; see id. (describing how Californians were
outraged when Melvin Carter was released early from prison based on his good behavior after serving only
one-half of a 25-year sentence for 12 convictions of rape, and how the criminal justice system presented no
alternative but to release him even though Carter admitted to raping more than 100 women); see also id.
(noting that the brutal abduction and murder of California teenager Polly Klaas, allegedly committed by a
convicted sex offender has fueled public outrage even further); Legislature Urged to Expand Response to
SexualAssaults, Bus. WuNE, Apr. 29,1993, at 1 (estimating that sexual abuse is the most under-reported crime
in the nation, with only 16% of rapes reported to the police); id. (adding that 16% of the three million cases
of reported child abuse involve sexual abuse and that 35% of adult women and 20o of adult men in this
country were victims of sexual abuse as children); id. (noting that sex offenders have become, overall, the most
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seven states already have enacted legislation that forces serial sex offenders to
register with local law enforcement agencies upon moving into a community, and
many Americans are debating the delicate balance between individual rights and
public safety with respect to these offenders.'
6
Joseph A. Tommasino
Crimes; search and seizure warrants-HIV testing of sexual offenders
Penal Code § 1524.1 (amended).
ABX 109 (Martinez); 1994 STAT. Ch. 20X
Existing law provides for the issuance of a search warrant' authorizing the
testing of a defendant for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV),2 provided
that certain conditions have been met First, the defendant must have been
rapidly increasing category of incarcerated offenders, and the mental health community has attempted to
enhance community safety by providing treatment to these offenders, both pre-release from prison and on an
outpatient basis, with about 1500 sex offender treatment programs throughout the country).
16. Hanson, supra note 15; see id. (stating that in Texas, a judge is notorious for promoting the
reinstitution of castration as a way to deal with serial sex offenders; in Florida, the Legislature recently passed
a bill mandating chemical castration for twice-convicted rapists; and researchers in various states are
advocating the use of antidepressants to treat sex offenders); Christy Hoppe & Diane Jennings, Ex-inmates
Pose Quandary for Many States Convicts Seen as Threat Even After Their Release, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Aug. 29, 1993, at IA (commenting on the state of Texas and its problematic combination of a high number of
violent offenders, a tight budget, and a vocal public that demands justice: if lawmakers demanded that every
inmate serve 100% of his or her sentence, the cost in prison construction, correctional officers, management,
and prison maintenance would be astronomical and state government would come to a standstill; on the other
hand, if the state created more alternative programs, greater after-care, more counseling, more job placement,
and the like, then the result would eventually be better in that many fewer inmates would return to crime;
however, that tactic poses major problems since it costs money and the public would see it as coddling the
inmate, and ifjust one convicted murderer or rapist was released and attacked someone else, the whole program
would be perceived as a failure).
1. See CAL PENALCODE § 1523 (West 1982) (defining search warrant as a written order in the name
of the people, signed by a magistrate and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property and bring it before the magistrate); see also People v. Kesey, 250 Cal. App. 2d 669, 671, 58 Cal. Rptr.
625, 626 (1967) (holding that probable cause must exist for a search warrant to be issued).
2. See CAL. HEALTH &SAFETY CODE§ 26(b) (West 1990) (defining HIV as the etiologic virus of the
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) disease).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1 (amended by Chapter 20X); see id. (setting forth the conditions to
include a hearing to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense and
that blood, semen, or other specified bodily fluids had been transferred from the accused to the victim); see also
Bill Callahan, San Carlos Man Will Stand Trial in Series of Rapes, SAN DIEGO UNiON-TRIB., Sept. 16, 1992,
at B2 (indicating that a court ordered a defendant to undergo medical tests and if the results were positive, to
notify the victim that she was in risk of contracting the HIV); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3912 (1994), FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 381.004 (West 1993), GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-15(a) (1994) (mandating HIV testing of a
defendant once probable cause has been established).
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charged by a complaint,4 information,5 or indictment.6 Second, there must be
probable cause7 to believe that the defendant committed the offense, and that any
body fluid capable of transmitting the virus has been transferred from the accused
to the victim.8
Chapter 20X expands the instances for which a search warrant may be issued.9
Under Chapter 20X, upon the victim's request, the defendant may be tested even
when he or she has not been charged with the offense necessitating an HIV test,
but has been charged with a separate crime as long as probable cause exists and
the victim has filed a police report alleging the commission of the separate
uncharged offense.'0
Under existing law it is a misdemeanor" to disclose test result information that
breaches medical confidentiality.' 2 Chapter 20X also makes it a misdemeanor to
file a false report of sexual assault for purposes of obtaining an HIV test and
makes it a separate misdemeanor each time the person filing the false report
discloses the HIV test information obtained under this statute.
3
4. See CAL. PENALCODE § 691(d) (Vest Supp. 1994) (defining complaint).
5. See id. (defining information); see also People v. Gahagan, 14 N.E. 2d 838, 839 (Ill. 1938) (stating
that an information is a formal presentation of a criminal charge against a person by the state's attorney instead
of by a grand jury as with an indictment).
6. CAL PENAL CODE § 1524.1(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 20X); see id. § 889 (West 1985) (defining
indictment).
7. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (holding that probable cause is a fluid concept
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts, not readily, or even usefully, reduced
to a neat set of legal rules); Brineger v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1979) (holding that probable cause
exists where the facts and circumstances are within the officers' knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense has been or is being committed).
8. CAL. PENALCODE § 1524.1(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 20X).
9. Id. § 1524.1(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 20X).
10. Id. § 1524.1 (amended by Chapter 20X). The charged offense and the uncharged offense must be
ones that could be charged under California Penal Code § 220 (assault with intent to commit mayhem, rape,
sodomy, oral copulation, rape in concert with another, lascivious acts upon a child, or penetration of genitals
or anus with foreign object); § 261 (rape); § 261.5 (unlawful sexual intercourse with person under age of 18);
§ 262 (rape of spouse); § 264.1 (rape or penetration of genital or anal openings by foreign object, etc.; acting
in concert by force or violence); § 286 (sodomy); § 288 (lewd or lascivious acts with child under age 14); §
288a (oral copulation); § 288.5 (continuous sexual abuse of a child); § 289 (penetration of genital or anal
openings by foreign object); § 289.5 (rape or sodomy). td. § 1524.1(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 20X). See
generally 2 B.E. WmnVI & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Sexual Offenses and Other
Crimes Against Decency & Morals, §§ 768-792 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994) (explaining the above offenses).
11. See CAL PENALCODE § 17(a) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that every other crime besides a felony
is a misdemeanor except those classified as infractions); id. § 19.2 (West Supp. 1994) (detailing the punishment
for a misdemeanor); see also United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287, 293 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that where
an offense is considered alternately a felony or misdemeanor, it is considered a felony until judgment); County
of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 219 Cal. App. 2d 838, 844,33 Cal. Rptr. 503,507 (1963) (holding that
punishment for a misdemeanor under the California Penal Code does not apply to city ordinances that have
their own punishment provision).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1(h) (amended by Chapter 20X).
13. Id.
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COMMENT
At this time, the victim of a particular sex offense is deemed to have the right
to know if he or she is infected by HIv, and if so, whether it was because of an
offense committed against him or her.14 Although, this appears to be a worthy
cause, Chapter 20X may encounter complications regarding the defendant's right
to privacy in regards to confidentiality.' s
Since 1988, California law has mandated that any person charged with a
complaint, information, or indictment for a violent sexual assault, is to be tested
for AIDS,' 6 as long as there is cause to believe that the assault involved the
transfer of body fluids.' 7 Courts authorizing blood testing face the provisions of
the Fourth Amendment as a barrier to obtaining such tests. 8 Under this
amendment, the rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed. 9 Because
the Fourth Amendment only prohibits unreasonable searches, various courts have
14. CAL. PENAL CODE §1524.1(a) (amended by Chapter 20X) (indicating that the primary purpose of
the testing and disclosure is to benefit the victim of a crime by informing the victim whether the defendant is
infected with HIV); see ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMIrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 109X, at
4 (Apr. 5, 1994) (stating that, previously, if the judge or prosecutor could not or would not elect to prosecute
a defendant, then the victim was not entitled to information regarding the defendant's medical status); see also
Anne Burke, Is HIV Privacy Law Protecting Rapists?; Confidentiality Rule Leaves Victims in the Dark
Traumatized, S.F. EXAM., Dec. 12, 1993, at B3 (stating that five months after being raped, a woman was
notified that she might have HIV; however, she was not able to learn if she was infected by the defendant);
Diane Martinez, HIV Testing in Rape Cases, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1994, at B6 (indicating that by providing
victims of rape with information concerning HIV and the defendant's status in regards to HIV, the victims are
given control over lives); Josh Meyer, Women Fear Rape Suspect May Have Given Them HIV, L.A. TMEs,
Jan. 10, 1994, at Al (indicating that some rape victims have been notified that they may have been infected
with the HIV, but they are unable to ascertain whether they were infected by the defendant or another person);
cf. Martinez, supra (stating that serial rapists have forfeited their right to privacy when they commit a crime
that may infect their victim with the HIV).
15. ASSEmBLYCOMMr EONPUBLICSAF ,CoMMTEEANALYSIsoFAB 109X, at4 (Apr. 5,1994).
16. See Emily Campbell, Mandatory AIDS Testing and Privacy: A Psycholegal Perspective, 66 N.D.
L. REV. 449 (1990) (outlining the cause of AIDS as an infection by the human T-cell lymphotropic
retrovirus/lymphadenopathy-associated virus (HTLVlM). Because of the virus, the body's T-cells, specifically
the T-4 cell that is responsible for warding off infection, become weakened. Id. Eventually, the T-cells no
longer fight infection, but rather become a type of factory that reproduces the virus. Id.; see also id. at 458
(detailing the procedures available that test for the etiologic virus of AIDS, HIV, as the enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay test (ELISA) and the Western Block test). Both of these tests are used to detect the
presence of HTLV-III and although the ELISA test is not 100% accurate, the Western Block test is. Id.
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1 (amended by Chapter 20X); see Campbell, supra note 16, at 453
(explaining that the HIV has been found in several bodily fluids including blood, semen, saliva, tears, urine,
and breast milk). See generally David Kennon Moody, Note, Aids and Rape: The Constitutional Dimensions
of Mandatory Testing of Sex Offenders, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 238 (1990).
18. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766 (1966) (stating that a compulsory blood test
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961)
(holding that the exclusionary rule adopted for federal prosecutions in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), must also be applied to criminal prosecutions); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914)
(holding that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is illegal and cannot be used at the trial
of the defendant).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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molded a test that entails balancing the government's need to conduct the search
against the invasion of the person's privacy resulting from the search?
The governmental interest in mandating AIDS testing is to provide for the
physical and psychological welfare of the victim.2' However, the utility of such
a test has been questioned. 2
Primarily, it is viewed that although the alleged offender has been tested, the
results reveal nothing regarding the victim's status?3 Several concerns are
present: First, the offender's status, if negative, could be false because of the
seroconversion rate of the virs.2 Second, the victim might accept the offender's
negative status without question, developing a false sense of security, and thus
will refuse to be tested regularly and to take the necessary precautions to avoid
spreading HIV. s On the other hand, if the offender's status is positive, this report
could alarm the victim unnecessarily because the offender may have been infected
with the virus after the sexual contact with the victim, or flaws in the testing
procedure may have indicated a false positive.' The best method for determining
the status of victims is to test the victims themselves, not the offender?7
Still, others argue that victims who are at a risk of contracting the HIV may use
zidivudine, otherwise known as AZT, to delay the onset of AIDS.28 However,
20. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (reiterating that the
Fourth Amendment does not prescribe all search and seizures, only those which are unreasonable).
21. Martha A. Field, TestingforAIDS: Uses andAbuses, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 34, 100(1990); see id.
(providing that information regarding the offender's status has the potential to offer comfort to the victim or
eliminate uncertainty).
22. Bernadette Pratt Sadler, Rape and Mandatory HIV Testing, 67 WASH. L. REV. 195, 210-12 (1992).
23. Id. at 210.
24. Id.; see id. at 196 (indicating that seroconversion is the process by which the body produces
antibodies to the viral infection); Emily Campbell, supra note 16, at 458 (stating that the length of time before
a person's body starts producing antibodies that are detected through the testing procedure varies from six days
to eight weeks). But see Moody, supra note 17, at 241 (stating that there is generally a three to twelve week
delay before the body will produce antibodies in response to the HIV). However, some cases show that
individuals still test negative after 12 weeks, although they were infected prior to that time. Id. Virtually all
cases will test accurately after six months from the time of infection. Id.
25. Sadler, supra note 22, at 211; see Cost Analysis Questions Value of Routine HIV Testing, AIDS
ALERT, Aug. 1993, at 120 (warning that routine testing is not a substitute for precautions because HIV tests
will not detect recently infected patients who have not seroconverted).
26. Sadler, supra note 22, at 211; see False-Positive Serologic Tests for Human T.Cell Lymphotroplc
Virus Type ) Among Blood Donors Following Influenza Vaccination, JAMA, Apr. 28, 1993, at 2076 (giving
as examples, blood donors who had recently been vaccinated for influenza and who had tested positively for
HIV). However, the duration for testing falsely positive is under four months and the influenza vaccination is
not likely to cause a reaction after this time period has passed. Id.; see also Pennsylvania-Woman Sues Over
False-Positive Test, AIDS WEEKLY, May 17, 1993 (explaining that a woman who tested falsely positive for
an HIV test is suing her employer, a Pennsylvania hospital, for illegally barring her from work, making her test
results public, and failing to provide counseling after the results were known); Cost Analysis, supra note 25
(reporting that the actual rate of false positive test result is unknown).
27. Sadler, supra note 22, at 212.
28. Id.; see Dave Brown, Speedy Release ofAIDS Drug Challenged on Lack of Follow.Through, WASH,
PosT, Sept. 11, 1994, at A3 (indicating that AZT's benefits do not last beyond three years and they rarely
prolong a person's life when taken early in the infection period); Christiqe Gorman, Lets Not Be Too Hasty;
Activists Who Once Clamored for Speedier Approval ofAIDS Drugs Now Favor a More Deliberate Approach,
TME, Sept. 19, 1994, at 71 (explaining that AZT works by attacking a reverse transcriptase enzyme that helps
the HIV to copy itself); Joanne Kenen, FDA Assesses AIDS Drug Approval Policy, Reuters North American
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because AZT has severe side effects and is considered highly toxic, there is not
a guarantee that a doctor will prescribe AZT treatment for the victim solely due
to his or her exposure to the HIV.29
Not all authorities question the utility of mandatory HIV testing. According to
David Kennon Moody, author of AIDS and Rape: The Constitutional Dimensions
ofMandatory Testing of Sex Offenders, the possibility of a false sense of security
resulting from a negative testing result is outweighed by the probability that the
offender will be out of his latency period and will test positive if he has the HIV.30
If indeed the results are positive, the victim can begin AZT treatment and take
other precautions. 3' Further, because there is only a 28.2% risk of testing falsely
positive, it is likely that the test will be accurate3 2
Still other questions remain regarding the extent of the alleged offender's
invasion of privacy. This invasion must be weighed against the government's
interest.33 There appears to be two factors to examine in an invasiveness inquiry
of Chapter 20X: (1) The intrusion upon the defendant's body itself, and (2) the
intrusion upon the defendant's privacy by releasing the test results?'
The United States Supreme Court has come to recognize that blood tests are a
minimal intrusion upon a person's body because they "are widely used and
involve virtually no risk, trauma, or pain. '35 Furthermore, as argued by Bernadette
Pratt Sadler, author of When Rape Victims' Rights Meet Privacy Rights:
Mandatory HIV Testing, Striking the Fourth Amendment Balance, by engaging
in criminal behavior that is known to transmit AIDS, the offender should
reasonably expect his blood to be tested; the defendant's own actions weaken his
expectation.36 However, according to Martha A. Field, a professor at Harvard
Law School, "it is antithetical to our system of justice to presume that an
individual has committed a crime of which he is accused." '37 She goes further to
Wire, Sept. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (reporting that AZT, developed in 1987,
is the best-known anti-AIDS medication).
29. Sadler, supra note 22, at 212; see id. (listing the side effects to include bone marrow suppression
resulting in anemia that requires transfusions and neutropenia, a condition associated with acute leukemia,
infection, and arthritis, and chronic spleen enlargement); see also Moody, supra note 17, at 242 (explaining
that users of AZT also have problems with nausea, muscle pain, insomnia, and severe headaches); id. at 243
(explaining that the annual cost of AZT treatment exceeds $3000); cf. id. (stating that the National Institute of
Health has recommended reducing the dosage of AZT by half, thus reducing the cost of treatment and some
side effects).
30. Moody, supra note 17, at 255.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see id. (explaining that if the offender is in a high risk group, the HIV test is almost 100%
accurate); see also id. (defining high risk groups as homosexual men, bisexual men, and intravenous drug users
(citing Centers for Disease Control, AIDS and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States:
1988 Update, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., S-4, 7)).
33. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining that a Fourth Amendment search and seizure
issue must be analyzed under a balancing test).
34. Id.
35. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).
36. Sadler, supra note 22, at 207.
37. Field, supra note 21, at 101.
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declare that the culpability of an attacker is an important part of the justification
for requiring him to be tested, and that courts cannot assume culpability until after
conviction.3" Accordingly, many states require HIV testing only after the
defendant has been convicted of a sexual offense.39
California differs in this respect because the prosecution must only prove that
there is probable cause that the alleged offender committed the offense" and that
there was an exchange of blood, semen, or other bodily fluid capable of
transmitting HIV resulting from the attack.' Thus, Chapter 20X may face a
challenge that mandatory HIV testing violates the defendant's right to privacy
because it intrudes upon his or her body without first requiring the defendant to
be convicted for the sexual offense necessitating the test.
The second step in the two part invasion of privacy analysis is to look at the
confidentiality aspect of the statute. In Doe v. Connell,"2 a New York county court
judge was prohibited from ordering a defendant to undergo HIV testing because
the governing statute's disclosure provisions were not met. 3 Specifically, the
confidentiality statute authorized testing and disclosure only upon the consent of
the defendant." In California, however, once the test results have been
ascertained, Chapter 20X authorizes their release to the victim as long as probable
cause exists that the defendant committed the crime and bodily fluid was
exchanged. 5
Authorities argue that such a release of information is too much of an invasion
primarily because: (1) An analysis of the blood reveals medical information that
compromises an individual's right to confidentiality in his medical information;
46
38. Id. at 102.
39. Id.; see id. (stating that Illinois, Oregon and Washington all require conviction prior to mandating
HIV testing of a defendant); cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-3(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994), 1987 Or.
Laws 600, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 24.340 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring that the defendant be convicted of
the sexual offense before an HIV test will be mandated).
40. See supra note 10 (listing the applicable offenses).
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.1(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 20X).
42. 583 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1992).
43. Doe v. Connell, 583 N.Y.S.2d 707, 710 (1992); see Annotation, State Statutes or Regulations
Expressly Governing Disclosure of Fact that Person Has Tested Positive for Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) orAcquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 12 A.L.R.5TH 149, 170 (1993) (stating that the New
York AIDS confidentiality statute did not authorize a court order mandating the defendant to undergo testing
and it did not authorize the disclosure of the test results to the complainant and her husband without the consent
of the defendant).
44. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2781(1) (Consol. 1994).
45. CAL PENALCODE § 1524 .1(g) (amended by Chapter 20X); see id. § 1524.1(i) (authorizing victims
receiving information that the defendant has tested positive for the HIV virus to disclose the test results as "the
victim deems necessary to protect his or her health and safety or the health and safety of his or her family or
sexual partner"); see also id. § 1524.1(g) (amended by Chapter 20X) (mandating that no positive test results
be communicated to the victim or the accused without providing or offering counseling).
46. Sadler, supra note 22, at 208; see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977) (holding that a
statute requiring physicians to report recipients of certain prescription drugs was valid because it could not be
proven that there was a risk of improper dissemination). Thus, the court recognized a constitutional right to
privacy regarding the disclosure of medical information, even though there was no violation in this instance.
Id.
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and (2) tests for HIV are not analogous to blood alcohol tests or drug tests
because the impact of the results is more devastating.47 Sadler argues that the
stigma of being HIV positive has lead to increased discrimination against victims
of AIDS where social death is as certain as the physical death that is sure to
follow.4" Additionally, Sadler argues that forcing the defendant to undergo a test
deprives the individual of the choice to know or to remain unaware of his or her
HIV status.49
Moody declares that the California statute is unconstitutional because of its
confidentiality provisions.50 He makes arguments similar to Sadler's in that the
disclosure of one's HIV status is highly stigmatizing, and will probably lead to
discrimination in areas such as housing, employment, and health care.' Moody
also notes that in Whalen v. Roe,52 which upheld the constitutionality of a medical
disclosure statute, disclosure was limited to the state, whereas the California
statute authorizes disclosure to victims.53
Thus, Chapter 20X may also face challenges with respect to the confidentiality
of test results and the defendant's right to privacy because of the holding in
Whalen. However, as Doe v. Connell held, as long as the requirements of the
confidentiality statute are met, the defendant can be tested and the results
disclosed.m Chapter 20X authorizes testing and disclosure if the victim requests
the test and if probable cause exists to believe the defendant committed the crime
and that bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV was exchanged.55 Thus, under
the holding of Connell, Chapter 20X's provisions would be valid.
As has been illustrated, questions remain regarding the constitutionality of the
California Statute. Due to the balancing of the government's interest in protecting
the victim versus the invasion of the defendant's privacy, it appears that Chapter
20X will likely meet several challenges. However, the courts could very well find
that the interest of the victim's health outweighs the defendant's privacy invasion,
thereby upholding Chapter 20X; this is particularly true if the court focuses upon
47. Sadler supra note 22, at 209; see id. (explaining that the results of the test implicate every aspect
of the offender's life); see also People v. Thomas, 529 N.Y.S.2d 429, 431 (1988) (declaring the results of an
HIV test as a death sentence); Sadler supra note 22 at 208 (stating that the expected results after having
received a positive test are severe anxiety and depression as well as an increased risk of suicide, homicide, and
drug or alcohol abuse).
48. Sadler supra note 22, at 209.
49. Id.
50. Moody supra note 17, at 262-63.
51. Id. at 262.
52. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
53. Moody, supra note 17, at 263.
54. Connell, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
55. CAL PENAL CODE § 1524.1(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 20X); see supra notes 1-13 and
accompanying text (explaining the various provisions of Chapter 20X).
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Schmerber's holding that blood tests are minimally intrusive, and Connell's
analysis of authorization if the statute's provisions have been met.56
Marnie L Smith
Crimes; sentence enhancement-sex offenses: "one strike you're out"
Penal Code § 667.61 (new); §§ 667.71, 1203.066 (amended).
ABX 26 (Bergeson); 1994 STAT. Ch. 14X
Existing law provides for sentence enhancements under certain circumstances.'
Chapter 14X provides that, in addition to the sentence for specified sex offenses,2
a defendant will receive an indeterminate sentence enhancement of twenty-five
years to life imprisonment if any one of the following circumstances is fulfilled:
(1) The defendant has been previously convicted of the specified sex offenses,
including an offense committed in another jurisdiction that includes all of the
elements of a specified sex offense; 3 (2) the defendant kidnapped the victim of the
56. See Sehmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (holding that blood tests are minimally intrusive); John Doe, 583
N.Y.S.2d at 710 (holding that because the specific statutory authority requirement were not met, the defendant
could not be tested for HIV).
1. CAL- PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1994); see id. (providing for enhancement of sentences for
habitual criminals); id. § 667.8 (West 1988) (providing enhanced sentences for persons convicted of
kidnapping victims under 14 years of age to commit felony sexual offenses).
2. See id. § 667.61(c) (enacted by Chapter 14X) (mandating that this section shall apply to any of the
following offenses: (1) A violation of California Penal Code § 261(a)(2); (2) a violation of California Penal
Code § 262(a)(1); (3) a violation of California Penal Code § 264.1; (4) a violation of California Penal Code
§ 288(b); (5) a violation of California Penal Code § 289(a); (6) sodomy or oral copulation in violation of
California Penal Code §§ 286 or 288a by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury on the victim or another person; (7) a violation of California Penal Code § 288a, unless the
defendant qualifies for probation under California Penal Code § 1203.066); see also id. § 261 (West Supp.
1994) (defining the offense of rape); id. § 262 (Vest Supp. 1994) (defining the offense of rape of spouse); Id.
§ 264.1 (West 1988) (identifying the punishment for rape or penetration of genital or anal openings by foreign
objects); id. § 288 (West Supp. 1994) (imposing punishment for lewd or lascivious acts with a child under age
14); id. § 289 (West Supp. 1994) (imposing punishment for penetration of genital or anal openings by a foreign
object, etc.); id. § 667.61(0 (enacted by Chapter 14X) (mandating that if the specifications of this rule are met,
those specifications will be used to impose the punishment identified by this bill, rather than to impose the
punishment authorized under another law, unless another law provides for a greater penalty); id. § 667.61(g)
(enacted by Chapter 14X) (stating that if there are multiple victims during a single occasion, the term shall be
imposed on the defendant once for each separate victim); id. § 667.61(h) (enacted by Chapter 14X) (stating
that probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for, any
person who is subject to punishment under subdivision (c) of this section).
3. See id. § 667.61(d)(1) (enacted by Chapter 14X) (listing the circumstances that apply to the offenses
specified in subdivision (c)).
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present offense;4 (3) the defendant inflicted aggravated mayhem or torture on the
victim or on another person in the commission of the present offense; 5 or (4) the
defendant committed the present offense during the commission of a burglary
with intent to commit a specified sex offense.6
Chapter 14X also provides that the defendant will receive a punishment of
twenty-five years to life if any two of the following circumstances are true: (1)
The defendant kidnapped the victim;7 (2) the defendant committed the present
offense during a burglary;8 (3) the defendant personally inflicted great bodily
injury9 on the victim or another person in the commission of the present offense;
(4) the defendant used a dangerous or deadly weapon or firearm in the
commission of the present offense; t" (5) the defendant has been convicted in the
present case or cases of committing a specified sex offense against more than one
victim; (6) the defendant engaged in the tying or binding of the victim or another
person in the commission of the present offense; or (7) the defendant
administered a controlled substance to the victim by force, violence, or fear in the
4. See id. § 667.61(d)(2) (enacted by Chapter 14X) (stating that the movement of the victim must have
substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that level of risk necessarily inherent in
the underlying offense).
5. See id. § 667.61(c) (enacted by Chapter 14X) (stating that the offense must be in violation of
California Penal Code §§ 205 or 206); see also id. § 205 (West 1988) (mandating that a person is guilty of
aggravated mayhem when he or she unlawfully, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
physical or psychological well-being of another person, intentionally causes permanent disability or
disfigurement of another human being or deprives a human being of a limb, organ, or member of his or her
body). For purposes of this section, it is not necessary to prove an intent to kill. Id. Aggravated mayhem is a
felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole. Id; see also id. §
206 (West Supp. 1994) (stating that every person who, with the intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and
suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose, inflicts great bodily
injury as defined in California Penal Code § 12022.7, upon the person of another, is guilty of torture).
6. Id. § 667.61(c)-(d) (enacted by Chapter 14X); see id. § 460(a) (West Supp. 1994) (defining burglary
of the first degree); id. § 667.61(b) (enacted by Chapter 14X) (stating that except as provided in subdivision
(a), a person who is convicted of an offense specified in subdivision (c) under one of the circumstances
specified in subdivision (e) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life and shall not be
eligible for release on parole for 15 years except as provided in subdivision Ci)); id. § 667.610) (enacted by
Chapter 14X) (defining when a minimum term under this law may be reduced and by how much).
7. See id. § 667.61(e)(1) (enacted by Chapter 14X) (providing that, except as provided in California
Penal Code § 667.61(d)(4), the defendant must have kidnapped the victim of the present offense in violation
of California Penal Code §§ 207, 208, 209 or 209.5); see also id. § 207 (West Supp. 1994) (defining
kidnapping); id. § 208 (West Supp. 1994) (specifying the punishment and conditions of probation for
kidnapping with intent to commit rape or other sex related offenses where the victim is under 14 years of age);
id. § 209 (West Supp. 1994) (specifying the punishment for the crime of kidnapping for ransom, reward,
extortion, or robbery); id. § 209.5 (West Supp. 1994) (specifying the punishment and conditions for probation
for the crime of kidnapping during the commission of carjacking).
8. See id. § 667.61(e)(2) (enacted by Chapter 14X) (providing that, except as provided in California
Penal Code § 677.61(d)(4), the defendant must have committed the present offense during the commission of
a burglary, as defined in California Penal Code § 460(a), or during the commission of a burglary of a building,
including any commercial establishment, which was then closed to the public in violation of California Penal
Code § 459).
9. See id. §§ 12022.7, 12022.8 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (discussing great bodily injury).
10. See id. §§ 12022, 12022.3, 12022.5 (West Supp. 1994) (establishing the punishment for the crime
of using weapons in the commission of a crime).
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commission of the present offense." Chapter 14X also provides that a person
convicted of certain specified sex offenses in conjunction with any one of the
seven conditions listed above will be punished by imprisonment in state prison
for life, and will not be eligible for release on parole for fifteen years.
12
Existing law provides eligibility requirements for probation for persons
convicted of child sexual abuse.'3 Chapter 14X revises these eligibility require-
ments. 14 Chapter 14X adds to the list of offenders who may not be eligible for
probation or sentence suspension persons convicted of lewd or lascivious acts's
with a child under fourteen years of age while kidnapping the child victim or
having substantial sexual conduct 6 with the victim.'7 Further, Chapter 14X adds
to this ineligibility list persons convicted of continuous sexual abuse 8 of a child
while kidnapping the child victim or having substantial sexual conduct with the
victim. 9
Existing law provides, under certain circumstances, that persons convicted of
committing child sexual abuse are ineligible for probation?' However, existing
law also provides that if the defendant is closely related to the child, and if it is
in the child's best interest, the defendant may be eligible for probation, as long
as rehabilitation of the defendant is feasible and there is no threat of physical
harm to the child.2 Chapter 14X specifies that these conditions for probation will
no longer apply to certain specified sex offenses.22
11. Id. § 667.61(e)(1)-(7) (enacted by Chapter 14X); see id. § 12022.75 (West 1992) (mandating
additional punishment for administering a controlled substance against a victim's will).
12. Id. § 667.61(b) (enacted by Chapter 14X).
13. Id. § 1203.066 (amended by Chapter 14X).
14. Id.
15. See City of Shreveport v. Wilson, 83 So. 186, 188 (La. 1919) (defining lewd as lustful, indecent,
lascivious, or lecherous); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 882 (6th ed. 1990) (defining lascivious as tending to
excite lust; lewd; indecent; obscene; sexual impurity; tending to deprave the morals in respect to sexual
relations; or licentious).
16. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.066(b) (amended by Chapter 14X) (defining substantial sexual
conduct as meaning: Penetration of the vagina or rectum by the penis of the offender, or by any foreign object;
oral copulation; or masturbation of either the victim or the offender); People v. Grim, 9 Cal. App. 4th 1240,
1242, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 884, 885 (1992) (providing that any contact between the mouth of one person and the
sexual organs of another constitutes oral copulation and should be considered "substantial sexual conduct"),
17. CAL PENAL CODE §§ 1203.066(a)(6),(8) (amended by Chapter 14X); see id. § 1203.066(c)(4)
(amended by Chapter 14X) (stating that the defendant must e removed from the household of the victim until
the court determines that the best interests of the victim would be served by retuming the defendant to the
household of the victim).
18. See People v. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d 294,310,270 Cal. Rptr. 611, 620 (1990) (stating that "continuous
sexual abuse" of a child consists of three or more lewd or "substantial sexual acts with a child under fourteen
over a period of at least three months and that the jury must unanimously agree that at least three such acts
occurred").
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.066(a)(8) (amended by Chapter 14X).
20. Id. § 1203.066 (amended by Chapter 14X); see id. (providing that notwithstanding California Penal
Code § 1203, probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of a sentence be
suspended for, nor shall a finding bringing the defendant within the provisions of this section be stricken
pursuant to California Penal Code § 1385 for specified persons).
21. Id. § 1203.066(c)(1)-(5) (amended by Chapter 14X); see id. (listing the circumstances that must be
present before allowing probation).
22. Id. § 667.61(h) (enacted by Chapter 14X).
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COMMENT
Chapter 14X was enacted to increase the punishment for forcible sex
offenses.' Many sex offenders serve only half of their sentences before being
released and many eventually recidivate. 4 Chapter 14X was enacted to ensure
that violent sex offenders will not receive early release from incarceration.' Since
California is the first state to enact a "one-strike" rape law, it has yet to be tested
against the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.2
The Supreme Court has identified three objective factors to be used in
determining whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual."2 7 First, the gravity of
the offense must be compared to the harshness of the penalty.2 8 Second, the
sentence should be compared to sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction?9
Finally, the sentence should be compared to sentences in other jurisdictions?
In using this test to evaluate the provisions of Chapter 14X, it appears that
Chapter 14X will withstand a constitutional challenge."' First, since Chapter 14X
23. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMiTrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 26X, at 1 (Aug. 31, 1994); see Lynn Smith,
Dialing Up A Weapon Against Molestation; Agencies: By Next Summer, Californians Will Have A Hot Line
To Identify Convicted Se Offenders. But Is It Fair?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994, at 1 (stating that this crackdown
on sex crimes "reflects public anguish and frustration over several brutal and tragic killings of children by
parolees in recent months").
24. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMM=rrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 26X, at 2 (Aug. 16,
1994); see id. (stating that most sex offenders only serve 50% of their sentences and 50% recidivate after
release).
25. Id. at 2; see Eric Bailey & Paul Jacobs, One-strike Measure For Sex Offenders Praised; Bill To Give
California One Of Nations Toughest Rape Laws, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 2, 1994, at I (revealing that this law
will at least double the time spent behind bars by most hard core rapists and act as an effective deterrent to
others); Amy Wallace & Eric Baily, California Elections/Governor 'One Strike' Rape Bill Is Signed By
Wilson, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1994, at A3 (quoting Governor Wilson as stating that he had just signed "the
toughest rape law in the nation ... which requires up to life in prison for first time violent sex offenders").
26. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,290 (1983) (holding that a criminal
sentence must be proportionate to the defendant's crime); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976)
(holding that although the Court has applied the proportionality test in capital cases, it has not drawn a
distinction with cases of imprisonment).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Solem, 463 U.S. at 292 (identifying the three objective tests); id. at
294 (finding that "it is clear that a 25-year sentence is more severe than a 15-year sentence, but in most cases
it would be difficult to decide that the former violates the Eighth Amendment while the latter does not").
28. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292; see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977) (comparing the
seriousness of the crime of rape to murder and other crimes).
29. Solem, 463 U.S. at 291; see id. (stating that comparing sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction
may be "helpful").
30. Id.; see id. at 291-92 (stating that comparing the sentence to sentences in other jurisdictions may
be "useful").
31. Id.; see Simmons v. State of Iowa, 28 F.3d 1478, 1482 n.5 (8th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that the
proportionality analysis used by the Court in Solem was weakened by the Court's later decision in Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1990), where a plurality of the Court expressed a desire to narrow or overrule
Solem); id. (stating that if a statute is upheld by the Solem test, it will certainly survive the less stringent test
set forth in Harmelin); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 957 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (stating that Solem was
incorrect and should be overruled since the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee). But see
U.S. v. Morse, 983 F.2d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that while one plurality of the Harmelin Court
wanted to overrule Solem,a majority of the Court "either declined to expressly overrule Solem or explicitly
approved of Solem").
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only provides for sentence enhancements for certain extreme circumstances
during a rape, the harshness of the penalty appears to match the crime?'
Additionally, although the sentence enhancement mandated by Chapter 14X is
greater than sentences imposed in this and other jurisdictions, these factors are not
determinative.33
32. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.61 (enacted by Chapter 14X) (identifying the combination of
circumstances that require a sentence requirement of either life in prison with no possibility of parole until 25
years have been served or life in prison with no possibility of parole until 15 years have been served); see, e.g.,
id. § 667(a) (West Supp. 1994) (imposing a five-year enhancement for anyone convicted of a serious felony
who has previously been convicted of a serious felony in this state or any crime including all the elements of
any serious felony in any other jurisdiction); id. § 667.8 (West 1988) (providing an additional term of three
years for any person convicted of a sexual offense who kidnapped the victim and an additional term of nine
years if the victim was under 14 years of age); id. § 667.15 (West Supp. 1994) (providing a one or two-year
enhancement for an adult convicted of lewd and lascivious acts with a child or continuous sexual abuse upon
a minor if the adult uses child pornography during or before the act); id. § 12022(b) (West Supp. 1994)
(providing a one-year sentence enhancement for the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission
or attempted commission of a felony or an enhancement of one, two, or three years if the weapon was used in
a caijacking or attempted carijacking); see also ASsEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 26X, at 2 (Aug. 16, 1994) (providing that most rapists and child molesters cannot be cured
of their aberrant compulsions and should be separated from society); cf. N.Y. PENAL CODE § 130.35
(McKinney 1987) (providing that it is rape in the first degree to engage in sexual intercourse with a female:
(1) If committed by forcible compulsion; or (2) who is incapable of consent by reason of being physically
helpless; or (3) who is less than 11 years old). See generally Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n. 11 (1980)
(recognizing the validity of the proportionality principle only in extreme cases, such as life imprisonment for
trivial offenses); Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undennining the Effectiveness of
Determinate Sentence Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 79 (1981) (discussing an Arizona sentence enhancement
law that provides that anyone using a firearm in the commission of a rape is no longer eligible for a suspended
sentence); Carin C. Azarcon, Review of Selected 1993 California Legislation, Crimes; Sentence
Enhancement-Great Bodily Injury to the Elderly, 25 PAC. L.J. 368, 586-87 (1994) (discussing the sentence
enhancement imposed when any person who intentionally inflicts great bodily injury on a person causes
paralysis or a coma); Carin C. Azarcon, Review of Selected 1993 California Legislation, Crimes; Sentence
Enhancement-Sex Offenses Against Minors, 25 PAC. LJ. 368, 589 (1994) (describing the sentence
enhancement for an adult convicted of lewd or lascivious acts with a child or continuous sexual abuse upon
a minor); Greg A. Ruppert, Review of Selected 1993 California Legislation, Crimes; Sentence
Enhancement-Credible Threat, 25 PAC. L.J. 368, 584-85 (1994) (discussing the exemption of subordinate
terms from the double-base term-limit).
33. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 291-92 (commenting that comparing sentences with those in other
jurisdictions is merely helpful when determining the proportionality of a sentence); see, e.g., CAL PENAL CODE
§ 667.6 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that persons previously convicted of sex offenses, who are convicted
of new sex offenses, may receive a sentence enhancement of five or ten years imprisonment); see also Gary
T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Refon,
81 CAL L. REv. 61, 64 (1993) (stating that legislatures have increasingly enacted mandatory sentencing laws
with penalty provisions that are severe and that by 1990, 46 states had enacted mandatory sentence
enhancement laws); Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, Fourteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1983-84, 73 GEo. L.J. 671, 702 (1984) (discussing the
factors to be considered in determining whether a sentence should be considered "cruel and unusual" and
discussing the decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), where the Supreme Court determined that
the length of felony sentences is purely a matter of legislative prerogative). This absolute type of view was
softened by Solem, where the Supreme Court adopted a standard of "substantial deference" to the legislature.
Id; cf. MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-81 (1993) (specifying that every person convicted of a felony who had been
convicted twice previously of any felony of federal crime upon charges separately brought will be sentenced
to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for such felony, and the sentence will not be reduced or
suspended nor will the person be eligible for parole or probation); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366(2)(a)(l)-
(2) (Michie Supp. 1994) (providing that any person who commits a sexual assault and the crime results in
substantial bodily harm to the victim, the punishment will be imprisonment in state prison for life with no
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The Legislature has determined that these enhancements are necessary to curb
violent sex crimes. The Supreme Court gives "substantial deference" to the
broad authority that legislatures possess in determining the types and limits of
punishments for crimes.?5 As a result, since the harshness of the sentence man-
dated by Chapter 14X matches the gravity of the crimes, and since the courts are
hesitant to breach the legislature's authority to determine limits of punishment,
Chapter 14X should not be found to violate the Eight Amendment? 
6
Opponents of Chapter 14X nonetheless claim that these sentence enhancements
are arbitrary and disproportionate and that they add to the overcrowding problem
in California's prison system.37 Some opponents also claim that the harsh
punishment mandated by Chapter 14X will deter prosecutors from prosecuting
rape cases.38
Although Chapter 14X will increase California's prison population, it will still
help relieve prison overpopulation in the long run by qualifying California to
receive federal funding for prison construction.3 In light of public outcry against
possibility of parole or imprisonment in state prison for life with the possibility of parole, eligibility for which
begins when a minimum of 10 years has been served); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.230(1) (Michie Supp.
1994) (providing for a discretionary sentence of not less than one year and not more than 10 years for lewd acts
with a child under fourteen years of age); OR. REv. STAT. § 161.725 (1994) (providing that the maximum term
for an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for a dangerous offender is 30 years and identifying the factors
to be examined in determining sentencing); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974) (imposing life
imprisonment on defendants convicted of a felony after two previous felony convictions on separate occasions).
34. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITIEE ANALYSIS OF SB 26A, at 2 (Aug. 16,
1994).
35. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290; see id. at 289-90 (determining that successful challenges to proportionality
of particular sentences, outside capital sentences, will be exceedingly rare).
36. See id. (discussing proportionality of punishment); see also Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland,
supra note 33, at 703 (revealing that recent court decisions indicate that successful challenges to the
proportionality of sentences will be exceedingly unlikely).
37. Wallace & Bailey, supra note 25; see id. (stating that by 1998, Chapter 14X will only add about
11 inmates over those imprisoned under the "three strikes" law but that by 2025 there will be about 2000
additional inmates who will cost about $1.5 million for prison construction and about $40 million each year
in operating costs); Letter from Cathy R. Dreyfuss, Legislative Advocate, California Attorneys for Criminal
Justice, to Senator Marian Bergeson (July 27, 1994) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (stating that
the penal code is a poor medium for reaching potential criminals and that California's inmate population has
increased from 22,500 in 1979 to over 110,000 today); Letter from Francisco Lobaco, Legislative Director,
American Civil Liberties Union, to members of the Assembly Public Safety Committee, (Aug. 1, 1994) (copy
on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (stating that the increases in penalties by Chapter 14X are arbitrary and
disproportionate, and unnecessary since the court has the authority to impose consecutive sentences for each
separate count).
38. See Greg Lucas, PoliticalAd Watch, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 1994, at A2 (stating that Governor Wilson
faces opposition by several women's groups who feel that the draconian sentences might deter prosecutors
from taking rape cases to trial); see also One-strike Snags in Senate, CAL J. WEEKLY, Apr. 25, 1994, at Feature
1 (stating that the Legislature heard from women's groups who fear that, in cases of acquaintance rape, where
the only evidence is often a woman's word against a man's, prosecutors will be reluctant to file charges).
Experts also say that most rapes fall into this acquaintance rape category. Id. Others say it is possible, if
sentences for rape and murder are the same, that more rapists will kill their victims. Id.
39. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (providing that funding for state prisons will be
predicated on the state implementing truth-in-sentencing laws that ensure that violent offenders serve a
substantial portion of the sentences imposed); see also James A. Baker III, 'New Democrats' Seem Like 'Old
Republicans' On Crime, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, at M3 (discussing a new senate crime bill which would
allocates $3 billion to the states for 10 regional prisons, so long as the state ensures that all prisoners serve at
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repeat violent offenders, prosecutors face increased pressure to ensure that these
offenders stay off the streets.!
Kenneth J. Pogue
Crimes; sex offenses-victims who are prevented from resisting
Penal Code §§ 261, 286, 288a, 289 (amended).
ABX 85 (Martinez); 1994 STAT. Ch. 40X
Existing law provides definitions of rape,' sodomy,2 oral copulation,3 and
penetration by a foreign object.4 Under prior law, each of the definitions
least 85% of their allotted sentences); Crime-Law Wave, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 12, 1994, at A20 (stating that the
provision requiring states to ensure that prisoners will serve at least 85% of their sentences, to receive federal
prison funding, will help keep vicious criminals off the streets).
40. Baker, supra note 39, at M3; see id. (stating that public anger about crime is becoming extreme).
"The murder of Polly Klaas, the killing of Michael Jordan's father, or the slaughter of commuters on the Long
Island Railroad are symptoms of a broader pathology that has beset our society." Id.
I. See CAL PENALCODE § 261 (amended by Chapter 40X) (defining rape); People v. Jeff, 204 Cal.
App. 3d 309,324-28, 251 Cal. Rptr. 135, 143-46 (1988) (stating that rape may be committed by acts causing
only fear of immediate bodily harm to the victim or to another, and does not require threats of imminent harm);
People v. Sheffield, 9 Cal. App. 130, 132-33, 98 P. 67, 68-69 (1908) (providing that it is not unconstitutional
to make rape a felony, regardless of whether the accused intended to commit a crime or knew any facts which
would constitute his acts as a crime); see also State v. Simmons, 621 So. 2d 1135, 1138 (La. 1993) (stating that
simple rape is an act of anal or vaginal sexual intercourse with a female who is deemed to be legally incapable
of resisting or intelligently consenting). See generally 2 B.E. WrTtIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against Decency and Morals, § 778 (2d. ed. 1988) (discussing the crime of rape and
its elements).
2. See CAL PENAL CODE § 286(a) (amended by Chapter 40X) (defining sodomy); People v.
Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d 134, 170-71, 785 P.2d 857, 877, 266 Cal. Rptr. 309, 329 (1990) (stating that physical
evidence concerning the victim's body was sufficient to corroborate forcible sodomy), cert. denied sub nom.
Thompson v. California, 498 U.S. 881 (1990); People v. Martinez, 188 Cal. App. 3d 19,24-25,232 Cal. Rptr.
736, 739-40 (1986) (stating that penetration, however slight, remains an element of sodomy under the amended
statute defining sodomy); People v. Howard, 117 Cal. App. 3d 53, 55, 172 Cal. Rptr. 539, 541 (1981) (stating
that it is not necessary for a violation of the statutes proscribing the acts of sodomy and oral copulation which
require the victim to be unconscious of the nature of the act that the victim be completely unconscious); People
v. Hurd, 5 Cal. App. 3d 865, 876-77, 85 Cal. Rptr. 718, 725-26, (1970) (stating that the section proscribing
the offense of sodomy does not constitute an unconstitutional infringement on the defendant's right to privacy).
See generally 2 B.E. WImw & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against Decency
and Morals §§ 782,783 (2d. ed. 1988) (discussing the crime of sodomy and its elements).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a(a) (amended by Chapter 40X) (defining oral copulation); People v.
Hunter, 158 Cal. App. 2d 500, 505-06, 322 P.2d 942, 945 (1958) (stating that proof of copulation is not
required to sustain a conviction). See generally 2 B.E. WIrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
LAW, Crimes Against Decency and Morals §§ 784, 785 (2d. ed. 1988) (discussing the offense of oral
copulation and its elements).
4. CAL PENAL CODE §§ 261,286(a), 288a(a), 289 (amended by Chapter 40X); see id. § 289 (amended
by Chapter 40X) (defining penetration by a foreign object); id. § 289(k)(1) (amended by Chapter 40X) (stating
that "foreign object, substance, instrument, or device" includes any part of the body, except a sexual organ);
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discussed the circumstance whereby a victim is prevented from resisting by any
intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance,5 which has been
"administered by or with the privity of the accused." Chapter 40X deletes the
language "administered by or with the privity of the accused," and replaces it
with language applicable to situations in which the accused knew or reasonably
should have known of the victim's condition!
INTERPRETWVE COMMENT
The Legislative intent behind Chapter 40X is to bring more sexual offenders
to justice, and not allow them to escape accountability on a technicality.8 By
deleting the language "administered by or with the privity of the accused,"
Chapter 40X expands the definitions of these crimes to include situations where
the accused merely knew or should have known of the victim's intoxicated
condition? The author of this bill felt that whether or not the accused
administered the intoxicating substance should have no bearing on the accused's
culpability.'t In either case, the victim is prevented from resisting due to being
id. § 289(k)(2) (amended by Chapter 40X) (stating that "unknown object" includes any foreign object,
substance, instrument, or device, or any part of the body, including the male sexual organ, when it is not known
whether penetration was by the aforementioned male sex organ, or by a foreign object, substance, instrument,
or device, or by any other part of the body); People v. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d 321,334, 768 P.2d 1078, 1085, 256
Cal. Rptr. 401,408 (1989) (stating that each act of penetration which occurred during a continuous sexual
assaultive encounter may constitute separate violations). See generally 2 B.E. WiTKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTmIN,
CALmIRtNtA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against Decency and Morals § 792 (2d. ed. 1988) (discussing the crime
of penetration with a foreign object).
5. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11054-11058 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994) (listing the known
controlled substances which are provided for under the California Uniform Controlled Substances Act).
6. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 595, sec. 1, at 2576-77 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 261); id. § 4, at
2578-79 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §286); id. § 5, at 2580-81 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a); id. §
6 at 2581-83 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 289).
7. CAL PENAL CODE §§ 261(a)(3), 286(i), 288a(i), 289(e) (amended by Chapter 40X); see People v.
Mack, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1466, 1480-81, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 202-03 (1992) (stating that the relevance of the
resistance-suppressing substance is only to negate the inference of consent from what is in fact mere
submission; the fact that the victim willingly partook of what she knew was Percodan, is not relevant since the
accused knew, or should have known of her condition); Boro v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1224, 1228-
29, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 124-25 (1985) (stating that a victim need not be totally unconscious for the purposes
of a statute which includes in the definition of rape an act of sexual intercourse in which the victim is at the
time unconscious to the nature of the act and this is known to the accused).
8. ASSEmBLY WAYS & MEANS COMMrrTEE, COmMrTEE ANALYSIS OF ABX 85, at 1 (May 25, 1994).
9. See id. (suggesting a standard such as simple negligence as opposed to a standard of intent). This
change is directed toward not allowing the accused to escape accountability based upon a lack of intent. Id.
10. Id.
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intoxicated." Chapter 40X brings California law into conformity with the laws
of other states.12
Christian A. Ameri
Crimes; stalking-notification upon release of offender
Penal Code § 646.9 (amended).
ABX 95 (Burton); 1994 STAT. Ch. 12X
Existing law requires the notification of the pending release of violent
offenders' to certain parties who have requested such knowledge. Existing law
also defines the crime of stalking
11. Id.; ASSEmBLY CoMMrrrIEE ON PUBLIC SAFrY, CoMMrrrE ANALYsis OF ABX 85, at 1 (May 3,
1994).
12. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-6108(5) (Supp. 1994) (defining a form of rape, and madng provisions
for the accused to have known that the victim, at the time of the offense, was unconscious); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3502(a)(1)(C) (Supp. 1993) (defining rape, and making provisions for the accused to have known that
the victim, at the time of the offense, was incapable of understanding the nature of the act); id. § 21-
3506(a)(1)(C) (Supp. 1993) (defining aggravated criminal sodomy, and making provisions that the accused
either knew or should have known that the victim, at the time of the offense, was incapable of understanding
the nature of the act); OKiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(5) (West Supp. 1994) (defining rape, and providing
that the accused knew or should have known that the victim, at the time of the offense, was incapable of
understanding the nature of the act); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(5) (1990) (defining sodomy, and making
provisions for the accused to have known that the victim, at the time of the offense, was incapable of
understanding the nature of the act).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3058.8 (West Supp. 1994) (defining a violent offender a3 one convicted
of a violent felony); see also id. § 667.5(c) (West Supp. 1994) (listing those offenses deemed to be violent
felonies).
2. Id. § 3058.8 (West Supp. 1994).
3. Id. § 646.9(a) (amended by Chapter 12X); see id. (defining stalking as willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly following or harassing another person and making credible threats with the intent to place the person
in reasonable fear for their safety or that of their immediate family); see also id. § 646.9(d) (amended by
Chapter 12X) (defining harassing behavior as a series of acts intending to torment or annoy which serve no
legitimate purpose); id. § 646.9(e) (amended by Chapter 12X) (defining a credible threat as any threat made
'with the intent and apparent ability to carry it out so as to cause reasonable fear within the target); id. § 646,9(i)
(amended by Chapter 12X) (defining immediate family to include any spouse, parent, child, person related by
blood or marriage within the second degree, or any person regularly residing in the household or who within
the last six months resided regularly in the household); Peop!e v. Heilman, 25 Cal. App. 4th 391,401, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 422,428 (1994) (holding that the term "repeatedly" is not unconstitutionally vague). See generally
Kelli L. Attinello, Comment, Anti-Stalking Legislation: A Comparison of Traditional Remedies Available for
Victims of Harassment Versus California Penal Code Section 646.9,24 PAC. W. 1945 (1993) (discussing the
remedies available to victims of harassment before and after the enactment of California Penal Code § 646.9);
Christian P. Hurley, Review of Selected 1992 California Legislation, Crimes; Stalking, 24 PAC. U. 591,762
(1993) (discussing the ramifications of the 1992 amendments to California Penal Code § 646.9); Kathleen 0.
McAnaney et aL., Note, From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 819 (1992)
(discussing similarities and differences among various treatments of stalking legislation); Jennifer L. Miller,
Review of Selected 1993 California Legislation, Crimes; Stalking, 25 PAc. L.J. 368, 595 (1994) (discussing
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Chapter 12X requires the Department of Corrections4 or County Sheriff to give
notice, upon request, of the release from the state prison or county jail of any
offender convicted of stalking or a felony offense involving domestic violence
to any person the court defines as a victim of the offense, a family member of
such victim, or a witness to the offense.6 Chapter 12X further provides that all
information relating to the parties notified must remain confidential and must not
be provided to the offender.7
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
The Legislature enacted Chapter 12X believing that most stalkers return to the
target of their harassment.8 The Legislature has attempted to alleviate much of the
fear felt by victims in not knowing when an offender would be released.' The
Legislature has eliminated the necessity and time consumption of numerous
phone calls from prior victims desiring to know of any escape or pending release
the 1993 amendments to California Penal Code § 646.9); Arthur Highee, American Topics, INT'L HERALD
TRiB., June 6, 1992 (stating that advocates of victims' rights support anti-stalking laws as additional deterrents
to the kind of behavior that often precedes more violent acts); Constance Sommer, Senator, Wife Know Awful
Lot About Stalkers, L.A. TtaS, Mar. 18, 1993, at A5 (discussing the terror felt by Senator Robert Krueger and
his wife as they are forced to deal with a harasser who returns each time he is released from prison).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5000 (West Supp. 1994) (creating the Department of Corrections within
the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency).
5. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (West 1994) (defining domestic violence as that perpetrated against
a spouse or former spouse, a cohabitant or former cohabitant, a person with whom the offender is having or
has had a dating or engagement relationship, a person with whom the perpetrator has had a child, any child of
the perpetrator, or any person related to the perpetrator by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree);
see also CAL. FAM?. CODE § 6209 (West 1994) (defining a cohabitant as a person who regularly resides in the
household); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West Supp. 1994) (defining as a felony offense the willful infliction
of a corporal injury upon one's spouse, any person of the opposite sex with whom one cohabitates, or the
mother or father of one's child); People v. Holifield, 205 Cal. App. 3d 993, 1000, 252 Cal. Rptr. 729, 733-34
(1988) (explaining that "cohabitating" refers to an unrelated man and woman living together in a substantial
relationship which is manifested minimally by permanence and sexual or amorous intimacy).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(k)(1) (amended by Chapter 12X); see id. (providing that such
notification be made by telephone and certified mail to the last known address at least 15 days prior to the
release); see also id. (imposing the responsibility upon the victim, family members, and witnesses to keep
addresses current); id. § 646.9(k)(3)-(4) (amended by Chapter 12X) (extending the notification requirement
to escapes by offenders from an institution or reentry facility); id. § 646.9(k)(5) (amended by Chapter 12X)
(allowing substantial compliance to fulfill notification requirements); cf. Tax. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art.
56.11 (a) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring a victim be notified upon the release or escape of a convicted stalker);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.155(2) (West Supp.1994) (requiring the department of corrections to send
the victim, any witness, or any party specified in writing by the prosecuting attorney, notice of the parole,
release, community placement, work release placement, furlough, or escape of a convicted stalker, provided
such notice is requested in writing).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(k)(2) (amended by Chapter 12X).
8. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrrrEE, COMMrrrEE ANALYsIs OF ABX 95, at 2 (July 5, 1994) (stating
that the Domestic Violence Unit of the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office has informed the author of the
bill that it is a routine occurrence for stalkers to return to harass victims).
9. See id. (providing the purpose of the bill as expressed by the author is to lower the possible risk to
victims who do not know an offender has been released).
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to district attorneys, who must then use their time calling the appropriate jail for
the information.' °
Mark E. Bellamy
Crimes; trespass-credible verbal threats
Penal Code § 601 (amended).
ABX 87 (Alpert); STAT. Ch. 25X
Prior law provided that a person was guilty of trespass if he or she made a
credible threat' to cause serious bodily injufy to another person and, within
fourteen days of the threat, unlawfully entered into the person's residence,
surrounding property, or workplace.3 Chapter 25X instead declares that a person
is guilty of trespass if a credible threat to cause serious bodily injury is made to
another person with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her
safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family,4 and within thirty days of
making the threat, the person making the threat enters the person's residence,
surrounding property, or workplace, under specified circumstances.5
10. See SENATE FLOOR, COMsrrEa ANALYSISoFABX 95, at 2 (Aug. 16,1994) (expressing the desire
of victims to take steps to protect themselves by actively seeking information regarding release of the offender).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e) (West Supp. 1994) (defining credible threat within the California
stalking statute as a verbal or written threat, a threat implied by a pattern of conduct, or a combination of verbal
or written statements and conduct made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to
cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her
immediate family). See generally Greg A. Ruppert, Review of Selected 1993 California Legislation, Crimes;
Sentence Enhancement-Credible Threat, 25 PAC. W. 368, 584-85 (1994) (discussing credible threats in
relation to sentence enhancements).
2. See id. § 417.6(a) (West 1988) (defining serious bodily injury as a serious impairment of physical
condition, including but not limited to loss of consciousness, concussion, bone fracture, protracted loss or
impairment of function of any bodily member or organ, a wound requiring extensive suturing, or serious
disfigurement).
3. 1990 Cal. Legis Serv. ch. 1448, sec. 1, at 5670 (amending CAL PENAL CODE § 601); see CAL.
PENAL CODE § 601(b) (amended by Chapter 25X) (stating that an exception applies if the residence, real
property, or workplace is also that of the person making the threat); id. § 601(d) (amended by Chapter 25X)
(stating that a violation of this section is punishable by imprisonment of up to one year, a fine of up to $2000,
or both).
4. See CAL PENAL CODE § 422 (West Supp. 1994) (defining immediate family for purposes of a threat
of committing a crime against another or their immediate family: Any spouse, whether by marriage or not;
parent; child; any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree; or any person who
regularly resides in the household, or within the prior six months, regularly resided in the household).
5. Id. § 601(aXl)-(2) (amended by Chapter 25X); see id. § 601(a)(l) (amended by Chapter 25X)
(requiring that the person unlawfully enter the residence or surrounding property of the person threatened with
the intent to execute the threat against the target of the threat); id. § 601(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 25X)
(requiring that the person enter the threatened person's workplace with the knowledge that the place is the
threatened person's workplace, and therein carry out an act or acts to locate the threatened person without
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INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
The author of Chapter 25X asserts that prior to the enactment of Chapter 25X,
a loophole existed in the crime of trespass, whereby a person could threaten to
hurt another person's immediate family, and then unlawfully enter the person's
residence, surrounding property, or workplace, without being guilty of the
offense.6 By enacting Chapter 25X, the Legislature has alleviated this problem,
as a threat that puts a person in fear of his or her safety or the safety to his or her
immediate family will suffice to support a trespass prosecution! By enacting
Chapter 25X, the Legislature also provides a longer time period during which the
trespass may take place.8
Darren K. Cottriel
lawful purpose with the intent to carry out the threat against the target of the threat).
6. ASSEMiLY COMmrrEE ON PUBLIC SAFrry, CoMM=1TE ANALYSIS oFABX 87, at 3 (May 3,1994).
See generally 2 B.E. WmUdN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMIAL LAW, Crimes Against Property
§§ 679-687 (6th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994) (setting forth and discussing various California trespass statutes,
including California Penal Code § 601).
7. ASSEmBLY COMMnTE ON PUBLIC SAFEry, COMMIrE ANALYsIS OFABX 87, at 3 (May 3, 1994);
see CAL PENALCODE § 601(aXl)-(2) (amended by Chapter 25X) (providing that a person is guilty of trespass
who makes a credible threat to cause serious bodily injury to another person with the intent to place the person
in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family and within 30 days enters
the persons residence, surrounding property, or workplace). See generally CAL PENAL CODE § 646.9(a)-(j)
(West Supp. 1994) (setting forth the provisions of the California stalking statute, which makes it a crime for
any person to willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow or harass another person and who makes a credible
threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear); People v. Heilman, 25 Cal. App. 4th 391,401,
30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 426 (1994) (holding that the California Penal Code § 646.9, which makes stalking a
crime, is not unconstitutionally vague by its use of the term "repeatedly"); SENATE JUDICARY COMM T,
COMMI=rEE ANALYSIS OFABX 87, at 2 (Aug. 8, 1994) (stating that ABX 87 conforms criminal trespass law
to the law on stalking in that it requires the threat to be made with the intent to place another person in fear for
his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family).
8. ASSEmBLY COmmr EE ON PuBLIC SAFl, COMMMrIEE ANALYSIS OF ABX 87, at 3 (May 3, 1994);
see CAL PENAL CODE § 601(a)(1)-(2) (amended by Chapter 25X) (requiring that the unlawful entrance to the
threatened person's residence, surrounding property, or workplace occur within 30 days of a credible threat).
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